The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause by Bellin, Jeffrey
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2012
The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause
Jeffrey Bellin
William & Mary Law School, jbellin@wm.edu
Copyright c 2012 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Bellin, Jeffrey, "The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause" (2012). Faculty Publications. 1432.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1432
 1865 
THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE 
JEFFREY BELLIN∗ 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1866 
 I. WHAT THE COURT GOT RIGHT: TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY AND  
  THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE .......................................................... 1871 
A. The Enduring Challenge of Confrontation Clause 
Jurisprudence ............................................................................ 1871 
B. The Testimonial-Nontestimonial Dichotomy ............................. 1874 
 II. WHAT THE COURT GOT WRONG: NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY ........ 1877 
A. The Surprising Origins of the Testimonial-Nontestimonial 
Dichotomy ................................................................................. 1878 
B. The Constitutional Text: “Witnesses Against” .......................... 1881 
C. The Confronation Right at the Time of the Framing ................. 1888 
D. Summary .................................................................................... 1893 
 III. REPAIRING THE DOCTRINE: LIMITING THE ADMISSION OF  
  NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY ............................................................. 1893 
A. An Unavailability Requirement’s Remarkable Pedigree ........... 1894 
B. Unavailability As a Prerequisite to Admitting 
Nontestimonial Statements ........................................................ 1900 
C. A Historical Exception for Business Records and 
Analogous Hearsay ................................................................... 1904 
 IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AN UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT ....... 1910 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 1916 
 
Sharp turns in the Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence have left scholars reeling from conflicting emotions: 
exhilaration, despair, denial, and soon, perhaps, cynical acceptance.  While 
most commentators celebrated the demise of the incoherent Ohio v. Roberts 
framework, their excitement largely faded as the Court’s decisions in Davis v. 
Washington and Bryant v. Michigan revealed nascent flaws in the evolving 
doctrine and sharply curtailed the newly revitalized confrontation right. 
Recent scholarship strives to reanimate the jurisprudence by expanding the 
doctrinal definition of “testimonial” statements – the sole form of evidence 
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that the Court now recognizes as implicating the Confrontation Clause.  This 
Article targets a similar objective through a less-traveled path.  It accepts the 
Court’s focus on, and definition of, “testimonial” statements as a valid, even 
inevitable, jurisprudential development.  This Article seeks instead to expand 
the reach of the confrontation right to “nontestimonial” hearsay, arguing that 
constitutional limits – albeit less strict ones – are also warranted for this type 
of evidence in light of the policies, text, and history of the Confrontation 
Clause.  The Article then details how the Supreme Court can (consistent with 
the overarching historical, textual, and policy arguments noted above) 
integrate these limits on the admission of nontestimonial hearsay into its new 
jurisprudence. 
 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”  
 – United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment 
 
“I know not why . . . a man should have a constitutional claim to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in 
his absence, may be evidence against him.”  
 – Chief Justice John Marshall1 
INTRODUCTION 
Commentators cheered when the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. 
Washington2 in 2004.3  The decision finally put “some teeth in the 
 
1 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.14,694). 
2 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3 See Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph 
of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 192 
(2005) (describing Crawford as “a successful blend of originalism and formalism” that 
announced a rule that “turns on simple, clear requirements of testimony, cross-examination, 
and unavailability, rather than ad hoc estimates of reliability”); Jeffrey L. Fisher, 
Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1496 
(2006) (describing Crawford as a “significant victor[y]” for the “criminal defense bar” that 
“restored clarity to confrontation law”); Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning 
of “Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 273 (2005) (arguing that Crawford “represent[s] 
a great and beneficial development”); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 
91 VA. L. REV. 747, 750, 767 (2005) (stating that Crawford’s “reasoning is difficult to 
refute, and its fealty to early constitutional history is admirable”; it is “a salutary 
development in confrontation law”); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: 
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 512, 
522 (2005) (explaining that Crawford has “given real teeth to the Confrontation Clause in 
several frequently encountered and important situations” and forecasting “a future in which 
substantially more confrontation may be provided”); Roger C. Park, Purpose As a Guide to 
the Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 297, 297 (2005) (“I 
applaud the change from Ohio v. Roberts to Crawford v. Washington . . . .”); Robert M. 
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Confrontation Clause,” repudiating the wishy-washy and widely-reviled Ohio 
v. Roberts4 framework that governed the Court’s jurisprudence over the 
preceding two decades.5  Adding to the excitement, the reinvigoration of the 
Sixth Amendment confrontation right was led by Justice Scalia playing 
counter-to-type and striking a resounding blow against prosecutorial power.6 
Crawford was a victory not just for criminal defendants, but for the 
Constitution as well.  The Crawford Court reversed a conviction because the 
prosecution had introduced unconfronted, “testimonial” hearsay – the type of 
evidence most analogous to the sworn statements of absent witnesses that the 
Sixth Amendment’s drafters abhorred.7  Such hearsay is inadmissible against a 
criminal defendant, Crawford announced, because the Sixth Amendment 
demands face-to-face confrontation, not the “malleable” tests of reliability set 
forth in Roberts.8 
As ambitious as the case was, Crawford only mapped out the rough contours 
of the long-awaited Confrontation Clause revolution, leaving a number of 
important questions “for another day.”9  As the Supreme Court began to 
answer those questions in later cases, the new jurisprudence took a dramatic 
and surprising turn.  Three years after Crawford, the Court strictly cabined the 
category of hearsay to which the reinvigorated confrontation right applied.  
Specifically, Davis v. Washington10 held that while “testimonial” hearsay was 
inadmissible absent confrontation, “nontestimonial” hearsay – a broad category 
of admissible hearsay – was “not subject to the Confrontation Clause” at all.11  
The next blow to the celebrated reinvigoration of the Confrontation Clause 
came in the 2011 case of Michigan v. Bryant.12  In Bryant, a new majority of 
the Supreme Court seized the evolving jurisprudence from Justice Scalia’s 
guiding hand and, while claiming fidelity to Crawford, constricted the 
definition of “testimonial” statements to its minimalist core: statements 
 
Pitler, Symposium Introduction, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2005) (recounting post-
Crawford exuberance among attorneys and scholars involved in the case, as well as in 
newspaper reports). 
4 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
5 See Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 
607 (2004). 
6 Bibas, supra note 3, at 184 (noting the apparent irony that “Justice Scalia, long the 
darling of tough-on-crime conservatives” authored an opinion that “vindicated criminal 
defendants’ rights,” but adding that Justice Scalia had “occasionally shown a libertarian, 
pro-defendant streak in the past”). 
7 See infra pp. 47-48.  
8 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60, 69 (2004) (“[T]he only indicium of 
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.”). 
9 Id. at 68. 
10 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
11 Id. at 821. 
12 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
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“procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony.”13  In addition, the Bryant Court erected a framework for analyzing 
“primary purpose” that appears just as malleable as the Roberts test – a 
flexibility that, if Roberts is any guide, is more likely to favor the prosecution 
(by admitting hearsay) than the defense (by excluding it).14  Together, Bryant 
and Davis work a dramatic curtailment of the post-Crawford confrontation 
right.  The current Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Confrontation Clause 
addresses only “testimonial” statements, in concert with its pointed narrowing 
of the definition of “testimonial,” results in the elimination (not strengthening) 
of the constitutional restrictions on the bulk of admissible hearsay.15  As 
Bryant itself declares, statements admitted under many commonly utilized 
hearsay exceptions – for example, excited utterances, present sense 
impressions, co-conspirator statements, statements for medical diagnosis or 
treatment – will rarely be testimonial and consequently are now completely 
unregulated by the Confrontation Clause.16 
Scrambling to respond to the twists and turns of modern Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence, the Court’s critics, now including Justice Scalia, target 
 
13 Id. at 1155.  Justice Scalia argued in dissent that a testimonial statement is one that is 
made “with the understanding that it may be used to invoke the coercive machinery of the 
State against the accused.”  Id. at 1169 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 
(suggesting as one possible definition of “testimonial”: “statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial”).  In Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 
2221, 2243 (2012), Justice Alito proposed a further narrowing of the definition to statements 
“prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual.”  Only three other 
Justices, however, joined his opinion.  Id. at 31 (plurality opinion). 
14 See Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure: 
Crawford’s Birth Did Not Require That Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685, 695-96 
(2007) (remarking that Roberts “often resulted in scant protection as a practical matter” and 
“[o]nly occasionally . . . provide[d] protection even against facially problematic hearsay”); 
sources cited infra note 48; cf. Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 182 (Pa. 2012) 
(holding that a child’s statement to an investigating social worker that identified defendant 
as perpetrator of child abuse was not testimonial under Bryant); Lininger, supra note 3, at 
767.  
15 See Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban 
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the 
Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 468 n.291 (2007); Tom 
Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is A Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 405 
(2005) (“[O]ne of Crawford’s greatest shortcomings is its failure to specify confrontation 
requirements for nontestimonial hearsay.”). 
16 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.9 (emphasizing that statements admissible pursuant to 
many common hearsay exceptions “are, by their nature, made for a purpose other than use 
in a prosecution”); cf. Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of 
Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 357, 360 (2012) (emphasizing the 
increasing role, in light of changing communication norms, for present sense impressions in 
litigation, and the absence of Confrontation Clause restrictions on their admission). 
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the contracting definition of “testimonial.”  They urge the Court to capture 
more hearsay within the Confrontation Clause by adopting a broader definition 
of this critical term.17  This Article steers clear of that debate, accepting as 
generally sound the Court’s identification of a subset of out-of-court 
statements (roughly characterized as those made for purposes of litigation) that 
implicate the core of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  Instead, this 
Article proposes a different path toward a more muscular Confrontation Clause 
– a path that few scholars have suggested, much less fleshed out in any detail.18  
Specifically, the Article argues that, contrary to the Court’s largely 
unsupported (yet unanimous) conclusion in Davis, the Confrontation Clause is 
not solely concerned with “testimonial” statements, but also restricts the 
admission of “nontestimonial” hearsay, albeit to a lesser degree. 
While sharply criticizing the Court’s recent decisions, this Article 
recognizes that, by severely restricting the admissibility of testimonial hearsay, 
Crawford and its progeny indisputably improve Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence.  The admission of testimonial hearsay (narrowly defined) 
presents a unique affront to the Confrontation Clause.  If it is to do nothing 
else, the Clause must prevent the prosecution, with its inherent advantage in 
structuring criminal trials, from procuring admissible out-of-court substitutes 
for live testimony and thereby extinguishing the defendant’s right to cross 
examination.  When government agents generate out-of-court statements with 
an eye toward litigation, Crawford and its progeny rightly forbid the use of 
those statements absent confrontation.  The Court is wrong, however, to 
suggest that preventing “abusive governmental practices” is the only function 
of the confrontation right.19  The right also embodies a general preference for 
 
17 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Michael D. Cicchini, Dead Again: 
The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1321 (2011) 
(“[T]he proper inquiry to determine whether a statement is testimonial involves the 
statement’s use at trial.”); Michael D. Cicchini & Vincent Rust, Confrontation After 
Crawford v. Washington: Defining “Testimonial,” 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 531, 543 
(2006) (“[T]he term testimonial should be defined as all accusatory hearsay, i.e., hearsay 
that tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the identification of the 
defendant.”); Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened – and What Is Happening – to the 
Confrontation Clause?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 627 (2007) (arguing that “the best way to 
determine” whether a statement implicates the Confrontation Clause “is to ask whether the 
person was narrating completed events to a person of authority”); Friedman, supra note 3, at 
242 (presenting “a broad conceptual approach to the meaning of ‘testimonial’”); Josephine 
Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony” Does Not Mean Testimony and 
“Witness” Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 193 (2006) 
(proposing that the Court “adopt[] a functional approach to the term testimonial” that 
considers “whether the evidence functioned as testimony against the accused at the trial”).  
18 See infra note 187 (describing two similar but nonetheless distinct proposals). 
19 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (emphasizing the danger of the “introduction of out-of-
court statements . . . in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation 
of a witness to obtain evidence for trial”); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Right to 
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live testimony that compels prosecutors to produce available witnesses at trial 
instead of out-of-court assertions, whether those assertions are labeled 
“testimonial” or “nontestimonial.”20  It is this general preference, once a 
central facet of the confrontation right,21 that is inexcusably absent from the 
Court’s new jurisprudence. 
The path forward lies in preserving what the Court got right in Crawford (its 
intolerance for testimonial hearsay), while repairing its subsequent missteps 
(its indifference to nontestimonial hearsay).  An important component of this 
approach is the recognition that interpreting the confrontation right to apply to 
nontestimonial as well as testimonial hearsay does not mean that both types of 
hearsay should be treated identically.  As the admission of nontestimonial 
statements does not strike as closely to the historical and textual core of the 
confrontation right, it need not be restricted as severely (that is, excluded 
absent confrontation).  Rather, prior to admitting such evidence, courts can 
enforce a constitutional preference for live testimony – as they have in other 
contexts – by requiring the prosecution to demonstrate the out-of-court 
declarant’s “unavailability.”22  If a declarant is unavailable, the prosecutor can 
introduce her nontestimonial hearsay; but if the declarant can testify, the 
prosecutor must offer that testimony, rather than rely solely on the declarant’s 
hearsay. 
This Article’s proposed modification of modern Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence remedies the unjustified absence of constitutional restrictions on 
unconfronted, nontestimonial hearsay.  It also provides an opportunity to unify 
the nascent jurisprudence around a single uncontroversial principle: an 
overarching preference for live-witness testimony.23  The principle requires 
that, in making a case against a defendant, the prosecution must, whenever 
possible, choose live-witness testimony over “weaker” out-of-court 
substitutes.24  Crawford-era jurisprudence implicitly recognizes this principle, 
requiring witnesses to be brought to trial in lieu of the introduction of their 
 
Confrontation: Not a Mere Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 615, 616 (1992) 
(arguing that while government abuse is part of the rationale for the Clause, it “operates not 
as a direct restraint on abusive governmental practices, but as a grant of positive rights to 
those charged with a crime”); infra Part III. 
20 See infra Parts II, III. 
21 See infra Part III. 
22 See infra Part III. 
23 See David Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1655 (2009) 
(criticizing the absence in Crawford of “any serious effort to identify the underlying point of 
confrontation” (quoting Roger C. Park, Is Confrontation the Bottom Line?, 19 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 459, 466 (2007))). 
24 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (characterizing testimonial hearsay as 
a “weaker substitute for live testimony”); see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1171 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (same). 
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testimonial hearsay.25  As this Article explains, the Court should extend its 
application of the principle more broadly to nontestimonial statements as well. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I emphasizes the aspects of 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence that the Supreme Court got right in 
Crawford.  This Part characterizes the groundbreaking decisions of the past 
few years, and particularly the novel testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy, as 
a firm step forward in the Court’s long struggle to interpret the enigmatic 
constitutional text.  Part II hones in on what the Court got wrong in its new 
jurisprudence, critiquing the analytical moves made by the post-Crawford 
Court that lead not only to an appropriate focus on testimonial statements, but 
also to an erroneous conclusion that such statements constitute the sum total of 
out-of-court statements that implicate the Confrontation Clause.  Part III posits 
an improved interpretation of the confrontation right in light of the text, 
history, and underlying policies of the Confrontation Clause.  This 
interpretation, while parallel in many respects to existing jurisprudence, 
incorporates one critical difference – providing constitutional limits in the form 
of an unavailability requirement on the admission of nontestimonial hearsay.  
Part IV considers the policy implications of the proposal.  By building on the 
Court’s recent progress in interpreting the Confrontation Clause, and by 
eliminating the Court’s unfortunate interpretive errors, the proposed reform 
provides the basis for achieving a long-elusive goal: a Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence that is sensible, coherent, and strongly tethered to the text and 
history of the Sixth Amendment. 
I. WHAT THE COURT GOT RIGHT: TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY AND THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Analyzing Crawford in a broader context reveals with inescapable clarity 
that the decision represents a step forward in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence.  As explained below, given the right perspective, Crawford, or a 
decision much like it, seems not only correct, but almost inevitable, both in 
terms of the Court’s rejection of Roberts and its adoption of a testimonial-
nontestimonial analytical dichotomy. 
A. The Enduring Challenge of Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence 
Any assessment of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence must begin with the 
“sparse” constitutional text.26  The Sixth Amendment guarantee of an 
accused’s right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him”27 spawns an 
array of possible interpretations.  At a minimum, the right guarantees a 
defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine any witness called by the 
 
25 As explained below, the principle applies more strictly to testimonial statements, 
requiring exclusion of unavailable declarants’ testimonial hearsay.  Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see also infra Part III.B. 
26 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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prosecution at trial.28  After a prosecution witness testifies, the defense must be 
permitted to test the witness’s credibility before the jury through cross-
examination, the “‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth.’”29  The difficult interpretive question is how this right applies when the 
prosecution offers out-of-court statements of absent declarants – hearsay – as 
substantive evidence against the accused.30 
Over a century ago, Dean Wigmore took a famously narrow view, 
contending that the Confrontation Clause provides a right to cross-examine any 
live witness who testifies for the prosecution at trial, and nothing more.31  
Limits on the introduction of the statements of out-of-court declarants, 
Wigmore argued, were the province of the hearsay rules, not the 
Constitution.32  At the other extreme, the Confrontation Clause could be 
interpreted to bar any unconfronted statement whether made in or out of court.  
That interpretation would override “virtually every hearsay exception” the 
prosecution might invoke in a criminal trial.33 
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the two extreme positions 
described above, claiming throughout its history to be charting “a middle 
course.”34  In one of its first encounters with the Confrontation Clause, in the 
 
28 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (characterizing the “‘right to meet face 
to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial’” as “the irreducible literal meaning 
of the Clause” (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (“‘The main and essential 
purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination.’” (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1395, at 123 (3d ed. 1940))); AKHIL AMAR, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 129 (1997); Sklansky, supra note 23, at 1645 
(“The meaning of the term ‘confronted’ in the Sixth Amendment is . . . largely settled, and 
has been so for decades. Confrontation means an opportunity for cross-examination by 
defense counsel in front of the jury, ordinarily with the defendant and the witness both in the 
courtroom.”). 
29 Green, 399 at 158 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 1367). 
30 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43; cf. John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant 
Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1875 (2001) (“The problem of applying the 
Confrontation Clause to hearsay is among the most perplexing dilemmas of constitutional 
criminal procedure.”). 
31 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1397, at 1755 (1st ed. 1904); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
32 Wigmore argued: “The rule sanctioned by the Constitution is the hearsay rule as to 
cross-examination, with all the exceptions that may legitimately be found, developed, or 
created therein.”  WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1397, at 1755. 
33 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (stating that under this interpretation, “the 
Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as 
unintended and too extreme”). 
34 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.9. 
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1895 case of Mattox v. United States,35 the Court recognized that the 
confrontation right bars the introduction of some, but not all, out-of-court 
statements introduced against a defendant at trial.36  The Court has never 
explicitly wavered from this position, but its subsequent failure to chart a 
coherent middle path plagues the resulting jurisprudence.37 
To date, the Court has undertaken two major efforts to draw a dividing line 
between permissible and impermissible hearsay under the Confrontation 
Clause.  In the 1980 case of Roberts v. Ohio, the Court synthesized a “general 
approach” from its precedents.38  Although short on constitutional 
interpretation,39 Roberts boils down to a fairly intuitive logical argument: (1) 
the Sixth Amendment mandates confrontation to ensure that testimony is 
reliable, and thus (2) if the reliability of hearsay can be established in some 
other way (for example, by a judicial determination of reliability), 
confrontation is not required.40 
In 2004, the Crawford Court famously overturned Roberts, rejecting the 
significance under the Sixth Amendment of a judicial endorsement of an out-
of-court statement’s reliability.41  “The only indicium of reliability sufficient to 
satisfy constitutional demands,” Crawford announced, “is the one the 
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”42  Under Crawford and its 
progeny, whether an out-of-court statement implicates the Confrontation 
Clause depends on how the statement came about – that is, the statement’s 
“primary purpose.”43  If a statement is made or elicited primarily with an eye 
toward litigation, it is “testimonial” and generally inadmissible against the 
defendant, absent confrontation, in a criminal trial.44  If the statement is made 
 
35 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
36 Id. at 242-43. 
37 Akhil Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 690 (1996) 
(“[M]odern Supreme Court caselaw on the clause is surprisingly muddled in logic and 
exposition.”). 
38 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
39 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 6367 (1972) (stating that Roberts “makes no attempt to anchor its theory in 
either the language of the Sixth Amendment or its history”). 
40 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (describing the “underlying purpose” of the Confrontation 
Clause as being “to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant 
an effective means to test adverse evidence”); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 
862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (critiquing the Court’s Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence as “abstract[ing] from the right to its purposes, and then eliminat[ing] the 
right”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Constitutionalization of Hearsay: The Extent to Which 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments Permit or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules, 
76 MINN. L. REV. 521, 525 (1992). 
41 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 68. 
44 Crawford left the precise definition of testimonial undefined.  Id.  The most recent 
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or elicited with some other primary purpose, however, such as to evaluate and 
respond to an ongoing emergency, or as part of a casual conversation among 
friends, the statement is “nontestimonial” and its admission does not implicate 
the Confrontation Clause.45 
B. The Testimonial-Nontestimonial Dichotomy 
The Crawford framework’s clear improvement over Roberts appears in its 
analytical separation of “core,” “testimonial” statements from all other 
hearsay.46  While some commentators criticize Crawford’s “testimonial”-
“nontestimonial” dichotomy,47 such a distinction is essential to any coherent 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.  As discussed below, the failure of 
Roberts to prohibit unconfronted, testimonial hearsay led most directly to the 
case’s repudiation, and properly so. 
The Roberts framework provided no heightened barriers to the admission of 
“testimonial” statements.  Roberts treated testimonial and nontestimonial 
statements identically and, in fact, provided so few limits on the admission of 
either form of hearsay that commentators ridiculed the case as largely 
ineffectual.48  Roberts condoned the admission of any out-of-court statement 
(testimonial or otherwise) that fell within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception, 
or appeared trustworthy.49  Consequently, the Roberts framework adopted the 
 
guidance is reflected above.  See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). 
45 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155; Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419-20 (2007); Robert 
P. Mosteller, Giles v. California: Avoiding Serious Damage to Crawford’s Limited 
Revolution, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 679 (2009) (“Even though an incriminating, 
unconfronted statement is offered to convict the defendant, it is not covered at all by the 
Confrontation Clause unless the statement is deemed testimonial.”). 
46 Crawford, 541 U.S at 51. 
47 Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court’s distinction 
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements . . . is no better rooted in history than our 
current doctrine.”); Craig M. Bradley, Melendez-Diaz and the Right to Confrontation, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 315, 321 (2010) (asserting that “the main problem” with 
“Crawford/Davis . . . is that the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction has nothing to do 
with the defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses against him”); Aviva Orenstein, Sex, 
Threats and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v. Bedingfield for Modern 
Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 151 (2010) 
(describing the dichotomy as “[s]hort on nuance and hostile to issues of policy”). 
48 Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 
UCLA L. REV. 557, 558 (1988) (contending that Roberts relegated the right to confrontation 
to the position of a “minor adjunct” to non-constitutional evidence law); Lininger, supra 
note 3, at 756 (commenting that under Roberts, “the Confrontation Clause rarely presented 
any impediment to the admission of hearsay against the accused”); Mosteller, supra note 14, 
at 695-96. 
49 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (holding that the prosecution can establish the 
requisite reliability either by showing “particularized guarantees” of a statement’s 
“trustworthiness,” or by showing that the statement falls “within a firmly rooted hearsay 
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spirit, if not the letter, of Dean Wigmore’s minimalist position that non-
constitutional hearsay rules, rather than the Sixth Amendment, delineated the 
limits on the prosecution’s use of hearsay at trial.50 
Roberts’s failure to target testimonial hearsay meant that its framework did 
nothing to prevent deliberate evasion of the defendant’s core Sixth 
Amendment right to cross-examination.  As long as a judge deemed the 
resulting statement reliable, the prosecutor could, under Roberts, obtain out-of-
court statements, such as affidavits or videotaped examinations, and present 
them at trial in place of a live witness.  Illustrating this shortcoming, Akhil 
Amar posited an extreme example: a cunning prosecutor who adjourns trial 
just before calling a witness, then obtains a videotaped statement from the 
witness and presents the tape, in lieu of the witness, at trial.51  Clearly such 
evidence should be precluded by a constitutional right to confront one’s 
accusers, but Roberts did not dictate that result.  In short, Roberts permitted an 
“inquisitorial” system – the bane of the right to confrontation.52 
While non-constitutional hearsay rules prevented a full-fledged civil law 
system from taking root under Roberts, isolated inquisitorial practices did 
emerge.  One of the most noteworthy examples grew out of the wave of 
prosecutions necessitated by the “War on Drugs.”53  In a typical drug case, the 
prosecution must establish that the item in question is an illegal drug, as 
 
exception”). 
50 See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 1011, 1021 (1998) (highlighting the near perfect alignment of pre-Crawford 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and the federal hearsay rules); Jonakait, supra note 48, 
at 571-72 (explaining that, prior to Crawford, for the accused to “know the boundaries of 
this part of his confrontation right, [he] should look not to constitutional interpretation, but 
to evidence law”); Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable 
Breakdown of a Union: Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 
S.C. L. REV. 185, 201 (2004) (arguing that the Roberts test boiled down to “a restatement of 
Dean Wigmore’s general theory of admissibility for hearsay rule exceptions, promulgated in 
his 1912 treatise on evidence”).  As noted in Part III.A, Roberts itself prevented some 
prosecutorial abuses by requiring a showing of unavailability in the “usual case.”  Roberts, 
448 U.S. at 65.  The Court jettisoned this requirement shortly after Roberts, however.  See 
infra Part III.A. 
51 AMAR, supra note 28, at 129. 
52 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  The Court uses the descriptive terms “civil law” and 
“inquisitorial” interchangeably to refer to a system that “condones examination in private by 
judicial officers,” as opposed to the “common-law tradition . . . of live testimony in court 
subject to adversarial testing.”  Id. at 43.  For a skeptical assessment of the Court’s “anti-
inquisitorialism” in Crawford and elsewhere, see Sklansky, supra note 23, at 1674 (arguing, 
inter alia, that the modern Court “exaggerates the importance of Continental criminal 
procedure to the Founding generation”). 
53 See Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 754 (2002) (describing 
“America’s second war on drugs – the ongoing ban on the sale, possession and use of illegal 
narcotics”). 
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opposed to some innocuous substance such as baking soda or oregano.54  
Under Roberts’s permissive umbrella, statutes and judicial decisions allowed 
the prosecution to accomplish this with affidavits from non-testifying 
government chemists.55  Sworn affidavits, prepared by disinterested 
professionals, were nothing if not reliable and, consequently, Roberts did not 
prevent their introduction against criminal defendants.56 
As the post-Crawford Supreme Court would hold in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts and reiterate in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the prosecution’s 
presentation of sworn affidavits in lieu of live testimony violates any plausible 
interpretation of the defendant’s right to “be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”57  Indeed, over a century ago the Supreme Court explained that, 
“[t]he primary object of the constitutional provision . . . was to prevent 
depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a 
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness.”58 
If the Supreme Court had decided Melendez-Diaz prior to Crawford, the 
recent transformation of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence may have looked 
less like a revolution and more like a counterinsurgency.  The Court could 
have framed its rejection of Roberts-era case law as a simple recognition that 
 
54 Given that statutes must go to great lengths to criminalize certain substances and not 
others, the showing is not easy.   See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006) (criminalizing cocaine by 
listing as a “Schedule II” drug, substances consisting of “coca leaves, except coca leaves 
and extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or 
their salts have been removed; cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of 
isomers; ecgonine, its derivatives” (footnote omitted)). 
55 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 306 (2009); id. at 349-50 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (citing Sherman v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 139-42 (5th Cir. 1995); Minner v. 
Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311, 1313-15 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353, 
1359-60 (8th Cir. 1988)).  The certificates typically include the precise quantity as well.  See 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308; Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305 
(No. 07-591) (explaining that in that case “two state-employed analysts issued three sworn 
reports on letterhead from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health” that asserted, 
inter alia, “that the nineteen bags found in the police cruiser contained 22.16 grams of a 
substance containing cocaine”). 
56 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64 (faulting Roberts for “admit[ting] core testimonial 
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude”); see also Melendez-
Diaz, 557 U.S. at 349-50 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that “before Crawford” all 
the “Federal Courts of Appeals to consider the issue agreed” that the “Sixth Amendment 
does not require analysts to testify in court”); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 950 
N.E.2d 867, 871 (Mass. 2011) (“It is beyond question that prior to Crawford, drug 
certificates were broadly considered admissible against a criminal defendant in the absence 
of the testimony of the analyst.”). 
57 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310 (“There is little doubt that the documents at issue in 
this case fall within the ‘core class of testimonial statements’ thus described.”); see also 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2011). 
58 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); see also California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970). 
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its decisions had, perhaps unintentionally, introduced the long-spurned 
Wigmorian view of the Confrontation Clause59 – permitting the prosecution to 
evade even the most basic confrontation guarantee.  As Crawford states, and 
the facts of Melendez-Diaz demonstrate, “[l]eaving the regulation of out-of-
court statements to the law of evidence” renders “the Confrontation Clause 
powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”60 
In retrospect, then, the most surprising thing about the Court’s change of 
direction in Crawford is that it did not emerge sooner.  As Melendez-Diaz 
demonstrates, a testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy keyed to the purpose of 
the speaker or interrogator61 is a necessary, even inevitable, facet of 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  The Clause must, above all, prohibit the 
admission of out-of-court statements procured as substitutes for live-witness 
testimony.  If it does not, the constitutional guarantee of confrontation becomes 
meaningless.  An analytical framework that identifies and excludes 
“testimonial” hearsay permits this critical prioritization; its absence, as 
Crawford validly proclaimed, constituted Roberts’s “unpardonable vice.”62 
II. WHAT THE COURT GOT WRONG: NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY 
The preceding Part illustrates the aspect of the Crawford revolution that 
must be preserved.  Crawford and its progeny rightly target unconfronted, 
“testimonial” statements as the primary evil prohibited by the Confrontation 
Clause.  This Part begins the analysis of what the Crawford-era Court gets 
 
59 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51 (“[W]e once again reject the view that the Confrontation 
Clause[’s] . . . application to out-of-court statements . . . depends upon ‘the law of Evidence 
for the time being.’” (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397, at 104 (2d ed. 1923))); Green, 399 U.S. at 
155 (rejecting the contention that “the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a 
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at 
common law”).  Justice Breyer discussed the disconnect between Green and Roberts in a 
concurring opinion in Lilly v. Virginia: “The Court’s effort to tie the Clause so directly to 
the hearsay rule is of fairly recent vintage, compare [Roberts v. Ohio] with California v. 
Green.”  Lily v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
60 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 865 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the Court’s cases “found implicit in the Confrontation Clause 
some limitation upon hearsay evidence, since otherwise the government could subvert the 
confrontation right by putting on witnesses who know nothing except what an absent 
declarant said”). 
61 Prior to Bryant, the Court had not resolved whose (objectively analyzed) purpose 
controlled, the speaker’s or, where a statement was elicited during questioning, the 
questioner’s.  See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1161 n.11 (2011) (noting the 
“confusion” on this point).  The Bryant majority held that all perspectives were relevant to 
the inquiry.  Id. at 1160-61.  Justice Scalia disagreed, arguing that the speaker’s purpose 
controls.  Id. at 1169 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
62 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 
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wrong: its flawed rationale for that conclusion.  As discussed below, the Court 
missteps when it claims – as it has since Davis, the decision that immediately 
followed Crawford – that, as a textual and historical matter, the Sixth 
Amendment term “witnesses” itself applies only to “testimonial” statements.  
This interpretive error is not a purely academic matter.  If the Court’s 
intolerance for testimonial hearsay stemmed from the functional intuition 
discussed in Part I (a recognition that testimonial hearsay must, of course, be 
barred to preserve the defendant’s core Sixth Amendment right to cross-
examination), nontestimonial hearsay could still receive Confrontation Clause 
scrutiny.  The Court’s distinct textual claim that “witnesses” as used in the 
Sixth Amendment solely addresses “testimonial” hearsay forecloses this 
possibility.63  The discussion below explores the origins of the Court’s textual 
and historical reasoning on this critical point and articulates its flaws. 
A. The Surprising Origins of the Testimonial-Nontestimonial Dichotomy 
The Supreme Court’s equation of the term “witnesses” in the Sixth 
Amendment with “testimonial” statements traces its roots to a curious source.  
The core of Crawford’s analysis sprouted not from the criminal defense bar or 
historical authorities, but from the United States’ amicus brief in the 1991 case 
White v. Illinois.64  The amicus brief, arguing in support of the admission of a 
young child’s out-of-court allegations of sexual abuse, proposed a novel 
approach to interpreting the Confrontation Clause.  This alternative approach 
ignored the reliability of the child’s statements or her availability (the key 
variables under the then-governing Roberts framework), and deemed the 
statements unobjectionable because the child was not a “witness” as that term 
 
63 If a person who makes a nontestimonial assertion is not a “witness” under the 
Confrontation Clause, then the Clause is indifferent to the admission of that person’s 
unconfronted assertion against the defendant.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
64 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 20, White, 502 U.S. 346 (No. 90-6113) [hereinafter White Amicus Brief]; see 
also Michael R. Dreeben, Prefatory Article: The Confrontation Clause, the Law of 
Unintended Consequences, and the Structure of Sixth Amendment Analysis, 34 GEO. L.J. 
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, v n.17 (2005).  As Richard Friedman notes, Crawford’s origins 
can be traced even further back, to an earlier brief filed by the United States (and then-
Deputy Solicitor General Samuel Alito) in United States v. Inadi.  See Richard Friedman, 
The Story of Crawford, in EVIDENCE STORIES 335, at 343 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006).  The 
United States’ argument in Inadi, however, merely sought a hands-off approach to hearsay 
admitted under traditional hearsay exceptions, while acknowledging that the Court should 
more vigorously scrutinize, under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay “analogous to ex parte 
affidavits and depositions.”  Brief for the United States at 24-25, United States v. Inadi, 475 
U.S. 387 (1986) (No. 84-1580).  It was only in White that the United States presented a 
cognizable theory of the Clause that resembles (to a degree) what later emerged in 
Crawford. 
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was used in the Sixth Amendment.65  Fleshing out the point, the United States’ 
brief states: “For purposes of the Confrontation Clause, the term ‘witnesses 
against’ more fittingly describes those individuals who actually provide in-
court testimony or the functional equivalent – i.e., affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony or other statements (such as confessions) that are made with a view 
to legal proceedings.”66 
As the child’s hearsay in White v. Illinois arguably did not fit this 
description, the United States contended that admission of her statements – 
whether reliable or not – did not violate the Confrontation Clause.67  Although 
its analysis is sparse, the United States tethered its textual interpretation to the 
definition of “witness” given in Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary, An American 
Dictionary of the English Language.68  On this point, the United States 
parroted Justice Scalia’s dissent a year earlier in Maryland v. Craig, in which 
Justice Scalia relied on the same definition to disparage the majority’s 
conclusion that the presentation of trial testimony via closed-circuit television 
was constitutional.69 
During oral argument in White, Justice Scalia criticized Roberts and seized 
on the United States’ alternative interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 
proclaiming, “[m]aybe the solution lies in the word ‘witnesses.’  What 
constitutes a ‘witness’? . . .  [I]t may extend to nothing except witnesses in the 
formal sense, somebody who appears at trial or someone who makes a 
deposition or signs an affidavit in preparation for the trial.”70  The White 
majority roundly rejected the United States’ alternative theory, but Justice 
 
65 White Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 17. 
66 Id. at 18-19. 
67 Id. at 17. 
68 Id. at 18 (citing 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)).  The oral argument transcript reflects that the advocates for the United 
States and Illinois viewed the alternate position as a long shot.  Justice Scalia voiced support 
for the alternate position earlier in oral argument, but counsel for the United States began 
with the contention that the case should be decided under existing law, and used most of his 
time arguing that point. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, White, 502 U.S. 346 (No. 90-
6113) (“It’s our position that the case can be decided within the framework of Inadi . . . .”).  
Only after Justice Scalia asked if the United States was “abandoning” the “position that this 
material is not really covered by the Confrontation Clause anyway” did the Deputy Solicitor 
General discuss the alternative theory – a theory that provided the Court an opportunity to 
reconsider the Roberts framework, “if it’s inclined to do so.”  Id.  Responding to Justice 
Scalia, counsel for Illinois offered only that the State had assumed the Court would follow 
Roberts, but if not, “the State of Illinois . . . would probably agree with you that there is a 
question” as to whether the declarant “was actually a witness for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause.”  Id. at 22-23. 
69 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
70 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 15.  Justice Scalia added:  “That would 
make the Confrontation Clause make sense, and the States could continue to apply the 
hearsay rule.”  Id. 
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Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) endorsed it in a concurring opinion as “in 
some ways more consistent with the text and history of the Clause than our 
current jurisprudence.”71  After White, the United States’ theory would be 
nurtured by influential commentators, such as Akhil Amar and Richard 
Friedman, and ultimately blossom into law thirteen years later in Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion (joined by, inter alia, Justice Thomas) in Crawford.72  
Interestingly, while both Amar and Friedman adopted the basic premise of the 
United States’ brief (a testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy keyed to the 
statement’s purpose), neither scholar relied on Noah Webster’s dictionary 
definition of the term “witness” to do so.73  In fact, while generally opining 
that history supported the dichotomy, these scholars primarily emphasized the 
practical imperative for any sensible confrontation right to prohibit statements 
consciously elicited as a substitute for live testimony.74  As explained in Part I, 
 
71 White, 502 U.S. at 353; id. at 360 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas 
recognized that the “approach might be difficult to apply and might develop in a manner not 
entirely consistent with the crucial ‘witnesses against him’ phrase.”  Id. at 364; cf. Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (pointing out that in White, the Court “considered . . . 
and rejected” a proposal to “apply the Confrontation Clause only to testimonial 
statements”). 
72 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (citing the White concurrence and mentioning that the 
concurrence was “joined by Scalia, J.”); Dreeben, supra note 64, at xv-xviii (describing the 
influence of Friedman and Amar); Friedman, supra note 50, at 1013  (“[M]y approach is 
similar to those advanced by Justice Clarence Thomas [in White v. Illinois,] by the United 
States as amicus curiae in [that case], and by Professor Akhil Amar . . . .” (footnotes 
omitted)).  
73 See AMAR, supra note 28, at 129-30 (arguing that the Confrontation Clause requires 
cross-examination of any live-witness testimony and also, to avoid undermining that 
precept, any out-of-court declarant whose statement was “prepared for court use”); 
Friedman, supra note 50, at 1025-26 (arguing, based on history and policy, that if out-of-
court statements obtained to function as substitutes for testimony at trial are admissible, “the 
system has provided a mechanism by which witnesses, without actually appearing at trial, 
can create testimony for use there”; and stating that such statements “lie at the core of the 
concern underlying the Confrontation Clause”).  For another pre-Crawford argument that 
reaches the same result without the historical or textual arguments, see Michael H. Graham, 
The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX. L. REV. 
151, 192 (1978) (stating, prior to Crawford, that “courts have apparently assumed that every 
hearsay statement introduced by the Government is a statement of a witness ‘against’ the 
defendant” because the courts adopt a “viewpoint of [the statement’s] use at trial” and 
suggesting that a “better approach” is to “judge the statement from the viewpoint of the 
circumstances under which it was made”). 
74 See supra note 72.  The two scholars take slightly different approaches.  Amar argues 
that the “ordinary, everyday meaning” of “witness” only encompasses persons who testify at 
trial, but he concedes that to avoid government manipulation, the term must also be read to 
encompass persons whose statements are recorded in “videotapes, transcripts, depositions, 
and affidavits” that were “prepared for court use.”  Amar, supra note 37, at 692-94.  
Friedman seeks to expand Amar’s definition to include anyone who makes a statement 
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little historical or textual exegesis is required on this point; without such a rule, 
an industrious prosecutor could render the confrontation right a nullity.75  As 
the next Section details, however, the Supreme Court in Crawford and Davis 
followed the United States’ lead and purported to find the testimonial-
nontestimonial distinction implicit in the term “witness” – a decision that leads 
inexorably to the elimination of constitutional restrictions on nontestimonial 
hearsay. 
B. The Constitutional Text: “Witnesses Against” 
Echoing Justice Thomas’s concurrence (and the United States’ amicus brief) 
in White, Crawford tethers its sweeping reinterpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause to the Framers’ use of the term “witnesses” in the Sixth Amendment.  
Citing Webster’s 1828 dictionary, the Crawford majority explained that, at the 
time of the Framing, the term “witnesses” would be understood to mean people 
“‘who bear testimony.’”76 “Testimony,” in turn, would be understood as a 
solemn declaration made with the “purpose” of establishing a fact.77  Building 
from these two definitions, Crawford formulated a “core class of ‘testimonial’ 
statements” which it did not fully define, but hinted might be characterized as 
“‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.’”78  These testimonial statements, the Court explained, 
are directly contemplated by the Confrontation Clause and thus (with the 
possible “sui generis” exception of dying declarations) cannot be admitted 
against a criminal defendant without confrontation, that is, cross-
examination.79 
The statements at issue in Crawford were “testimonial,” and thus the 
Crawford Court did not decide the level of constitutional scrutiny that would 
apply to the admission of nontestimonial statements.80  The Supreme Court 
answered this critical question in its next Confrontation Clause case, Davis v. 
 
“with the anticipation that, in all likelihood, the statement will be presented to the factfinder 
at trial.”  Friedman, supra note 50, at 1039.  Friedman does not explicitly draw a connection 
between this interpretation of “witness” and constitutional text or history, although he does 
find general support in both sources for his approach.  Id. at 1022-26. 
75 See supra Part I.B. 
76 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 68); see also Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 
77 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
78 Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410)). 
79 Id. at 56 n.6, 61.  The United States’ brief in White likely did not intend that 
“testimonial” statements be so strictly limited, so Crawford deviates from the United States’ 
position in that respect. 
80 Id. at 61. 
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Washington.81  The essentially unanimous Court in Davis82 reiterated its 
reliance on Webster’s dictionary, but now explained that the term “witnesses” 
as used in the Sixth Amendment was not only primarily directed at 
“testimonial” statements, but would have been understood at the Framing to be 
limited to this type of evidence.83  The Court (obtusely) proclaimed: “A 
limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must 
fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”84  Although 
some lower courts initially missed its import,85 this statement announced that 
nontestimonial statements did not implicate the Confrontation Clause at all 
and, consequently, could be admitted against a criminal defendant without 
limitation.  The Court eliminated any ambiguity arising from its subtle 
phrasing eight months later in Whorton v. Bockting, stating “[u]nder 
Crawford, . . . the Confrontation Clause has no application to [nontestimonial] 
statements.”86 
The Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Sixth Amendment term 
“witnesses” encompasses only “testimonial” statements gives rise to what may 
prove to be the most significant implication of the new Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence – the elimination of constitutional restrictions on the admission 
of nontestimonial hearsay.87  This development has become increasingly 
 
81 Davis, 547 U.S. at 823. 
82 Only Justice Thomas did not join the majority opinion in Davis, and his disagreement 
was that the Court’s definition of “witnesses” was too broad, not too narrow.  Id. at 835 
(Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).  Thus, the Justices were unanimous in deciding that 
the Confrontation Clause does not limit nontestimonial hearsay. 
83 Id. at 824 (majority opinion). 
84 Id.; see also id. at 821 (“Only [testimonial statements] cause the declarant to be a 
‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. . . .  It is the testimonial character 
of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional 
limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”); Josephine 
Ross, Crawford’s Short-Lived Revolution: How Davis v. Washington Reins in Crawford’s 
Reach, 83 N.D. L. REV. 387, 411 (2007) (critiquing Davis for “almost casually” 
extinguishing the broader scope of the confrontation right suggested in Crawford).  Bryant 
glosses over Davis’s role in this evolution, suggesting erroneously that Crawford, not Davis, 
“limited the Confrontation Clause’s reach to testimonial statements.”  Michigan v. Bryant, 
131 S. Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011).  The Court makes this same error in Bockting.  See Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Nontestimonial Hearsay After Crawford, Davis, and Bockting, 19 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 367, 370 n.15 (2007).  Friedman appears to agree with the Court’s treatment of 
nontestimonial hearsay.  See Friedman, supra note 50, at 1032 (“If the statement is not a 
testimonial one, then the declarant should not be deemed to have been acting as a witness in 
making it, and so the Clause should not apply – whether the declarant is available or not.”). 
85 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 369 n.11 (citing cases).  
86 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419-20 (2007). 
87 See Davies, supra note 15, at 468 n.291; Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 370; Lininger, 
supra note 15, at 405 (“[O]ne of Crawford’s greatest shortcomings is its failure to specify 
confrontation requirements for nontestimonial hearsay.”); Lininger, supra note 3, at 767 
(referencing a survey of post-Crawford court opinions that found that a substantial portion 
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important as the Court steadily narrows the definition of “testimonial” and, 
correspondingly, expands the category of nontestimonial hearsay.88 
As critics would quickly point out, the Court’s textual analysis is seriously 
flawed.89  Even accepting the Court’s method of constitutional exegesis, the 
definition of “witness” upon which Davis grounded its analysis is only one of 
five provided in Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary.90  The Supreme Court in 
Crawford and then Davis inexplicably chose the fifth of Webster’s definitions, 
ignoring other potentially applicable definitions such as the third definition: “A 
person who knows or sees any thing; one personally present; as, he was 
witness; he was an eye-witness.”91  As Randolph Jonakait explains: 
Those who bear testimony might be the people referred to as witnesses in 
the Confrontation Clause, but so too might be those who know something 
about a relevant event from their personal presence.  If, as in [one of] 
Webster’s [explanatory] example[s], one who saw the ratification 
ceremonies was a witness, then one who saw a shooting is also a 
witness.92 
Although neither Crawford nor the subsequent case law provides an 
explanation for the Court’s rejection of Webster’s third definition, an 
explanation appears in Justice Scalia’s pre-Crawford dissent in Maryland v. 
Craig.93  There, while critiquing a different facet of Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence, Justice Scalia recognized that Webster’s third definition “would 
cover hearsay evidence,” but dismissed it as “excluded in the Sixth 
Amendment by the words following the noun: ‘witnesses against him.’”94  
 
of evidence called into question under Crawford was ultimately ruled admissible because it 
was nontestimonial). 
88 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (suggesting that “testimonial” does not reach statements 
unless they were made or elicited “to create a record for trial” or for the purpose of “creating 
an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”); cf. Jeffrey Bellin, Applying Crawford’s 
Confrontation Right in a Digital Age, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33 (2012) (highlighting the 
possibility of a future where litigation depends to a great deal on nontestimonial, electronic 
evidence broadcast in text messages and on social media sites). 
89 See Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. 
Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 157 (2006). 
90 WEBSTER, supra note 68. 
91 Jonakait, supra note 89, at 159 (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 68); Maryland v. Craig, 
497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
92 Jonakait, supra note 89, at 159-61, 159 nn.26-27. 
93 Craig, 497 U.S. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).  It is unclear why Justice Scalia did not rely on 
another Framing-era dictionary, which provides only one pertinent definition of “witness” 
and supports Justice Scalia’s position much more powerfully:  “One who gives testimony.”  
2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1755); cf. Samuel A. 
Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States 
Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 234 (1999) (discussing various 
Framing-era dictionaries).  In fact, as discussed in the text, Webster’s dictionary provides 
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According to Justice Scalia (in Craig), the inclusion of the phrase “against 
him” demonstrated that the term “witnesses” in the Sixth Amendment 
“obviously refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at trial.”95  
Justice Scalia provided no further analysis to support his conclusion,96 and has 
not reintroduced the argument in his more recent Confrontation Clause 
opinions. 
Justice Scalia’s silence on this point in Davis and Crawford suggests that he 
has abandoned the argument that the textual phrase “against him” establishes 
the inapplicability of Webster’s third definition of “witness”; the argument 
likely impugns his current view (disputed by Justice Thomas) that even 
relatively informal hearsay statements – such as those at issue in Bryant – can 
qualify as “testimonial.”97  It is nevertheless worth noting that Justice Scalia’s 
conclusion in Craig is far from “obvious[].”98  For one thing, many state 
constitutions at the time of the Framing guaranteed the right of the accused to 
confront “the witnesses” without the accompanying phrase “against him.”99  
Absent some evidence that the Framers sought to create a narrower federal 
confrontation right than existed in states like Virginia and Pennsylvania, these 
parallel constitutional provisions suggest that the phrase “against him” was 
 
the most powerful evidence that the Johnson definition was not the only one in use at the 
time of the Framing.  See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
95 Craig, 497 U.S. at 864-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
346, 360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 864-65 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)); White Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 18 n.8 (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 864-65 
(Scalia, J. dissenting)). 
96 Craig considered limits on the defendant’s ability to physically confront a child 
witness who testified via closed-circuit television.  Craig, 497 U.S. at 840-41.  Since the 
child witness actually testified, there was no question that she was a “witness” under the 
Sixth Amendment.  Id. 
97 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  The argument that Justice Scalia made in 
Craig and at oral argument in White, see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 13, 
resonates with Justice Thomas’s position that only formal affidavits and the like trigger the 
Confrontation Clause.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
concurring and dissenting).  Justice Scalia now disagrees with Justice Thomas on this point 
and consequently may have consciously abandoned the Craig argument to avoid conceding 
the point.  Compare id. at 830 n.5 (majority opinion), with id. at 836 (Thomas, J., concurring 
and dissenting) (repeatedly citing the White concurrence, which Justice Scalia joined, for the 
proposition that only formal, out-of-court statements implicate the Confrontation Clause). 
98 Craig, 497 U.S. at 865. 
99 For pertinent state constitutional provisions, see WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1397, at 
155-58 n.1.  The Virginia Constitution drafted largely by George Mason guarantees the 
defendant’s right “to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses”; the Pennsylvania 
Constitution provides a similar right “to be confronted with the witnesses.”  See Graham 
Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 210-
12 & n.18 (1984) (“The language of the confrontation clause apparently originated in a like 
provision contained in Article 8 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights . . . .”); Daniel Pollitt, 
The Right of Confrontation, Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 398 (1959).  
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inserted either for clarity or rhetorical effect, rather than, as Justice Scalia 
suggested in Craig, to narrow the right’s scope. 
With respect to clarity, the most logical explanation for the drafters’ 
inclusion of the phrase “against him” in the Sixth Amendment is the separation 
of the broad category of “witnesses” – i.e., people who perceived relevant 
information, but play no role in a criminal proceeding – from the much smaller 
category of “witnesses against” who contribute to the prosecution’s case.  Only 
this latter category, consisting of persons whose testimony or out-of-court 
statements are introduced in the prosecution’s case, triggers the confrontation 
right.  On this reading, the phrase “against him” does not limit the Sixth 
Amendment command to statements of persons who formally “give 
testimony,” but rather clarifies that the prosecution has no obligation to 
confront the defendant with every person possessing relevant information 
about a crime.100 
In terms of rhetoric, the phrase “witnesses against him” creates an elegant 
contrast in the Sixth Amendment to the immediately following right to 
“compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”101  One could 
imagine the snickering among the Constitution’s masterful draftsmen if the 
proposed amendment omitted this contrast and blandly stated that the 
defendant had the right “to be confronted with the witnesses; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.”102 
As the preceding discussion suggests, neither Justice Scalia’s unsupported 
assertions for the Court in Crawford and Davis, nor his earlier argument in his 
dissent in Craig, explain why, as a matter of textual interpretation, the term 
“witnesses” should be limited to persons who “bear testimony.”103  To the 
extent these efforts to narrowly define “witnesses” accomplish anything, it is to 
 
100 This interpretation answers Amar’s contention that the term “witness” in the 
Confrontation Clause cannot mean “a person who sees an underlying out-of-court event.”  
Amar, supra note 37, at 695 n.212.  Amar argues that such an interpretation is facially 
absurd because it would capture persons who “never declare[] anything, in court or out” as 
well as persons who do make statements but whose statements “are never alluded to at 
trial.”  Id. (“[T]he government need not somehow bring [these witnesses] face to face with 
the defendant.”).  As explained previously, these persons may indeed be covered by the term 
“witnesses” but are then unequivocally excluded by the addition of the phrase “against 
him.”  See supra text accompanying note 94; cf. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 
U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (emphasizing, in rejecting a claim that the government violated the 
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process by deporting percipient witnesses, that “the 
Sixth Amendment does not by its terms grant to a criminal defendant the right to secure the 
attendance and testimony of any and all witnesses: it guarantees him ‘compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI)). 
101 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the defendant’s right “to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor”). 
102 Id. (emphasis added) (omitting the words “against him” and “in his favor”). 
103 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
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needlessly obscure a straightforward term.  Prior to Justice Scalia’s cogitations 
in Crawford, there was never any suggestion that the phrase “witnesses against 
him” possessed a mysterious meaning only discernible to eighteenth-century 
English speakers.  As Justice Scalia himself emphasized for a majority of the 
Court in a recent case, the “‘Constitution was written to be understood by the 
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning.’”104  And indeed, as Noah Webster’s 
dictionary reveals, and Justice Scalia actually acknowledged in Craig, the 
“normal and ordinary” meaning of the Confrontation Clause text was the same 
“in 1791 as today.”105  The term “witness” is a flexible one that encompasses 
both Noah Webster’s third and fifth definitions.  A “witness” is, in common 
usage, both a person who testifies at trial and a person with personal 
knowledge of something relevant to a criminal case.  Thus, there is no reason, 
based on the text, to eliminate either category from the Confrontation Clause’s 
scope.  The Sixth Amendment phrase “witnesses against” can most 
comfortably be read to encompass both the narrow meaning adopted by the 
modern Court and, whenever an out-of-court speaker’s hearsay is used at trial, 
the broader meaning implicitly accepted in pre-Crawford jurisprudence.106 
That a person becomes a “witness against” the defendant whenever the 
prosecution relies on her out-of-court statements as substantive evidence is 
perhaps best illustrated by the absurdity of the Court’s contrary contention as 
applied in cases such as Davis and Bryant.  The prosecution’s case in Bryant 
rested almost entirely on the out-of-court statement of the deceased victim, 
Anthony Covington, identifying Bryant as his killer.107  The government’s 
other evidence suggested only that the shooting occurred outside a house 
where Bryant lived, and that the victim purchased drugs from Bryant on prior 
occasions.108  The jury’s assessment of the credibility of Covington’s 
unconfronted statement determined Bryant’s fate.  In fact, during a pretrial 
hearing on the statement’s admissibility, the prosecutor warned that if the trial 
 
104 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). 
105 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
106 A conclusion that the Sixth Amendment phrase “witnesses against” applies to all 
speakers whose hearsay statements are offered by the prosecution is by no means radical.  In 
fact, the conclusion echoes pre-Crawford precedent – a body of case law that spans a 
century.  See Friedman, supra note 50, at 1030 (explaining that under pre-Crawford 
doctrine, “the declarant of any out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it 
asserts is treated as a ‘witness’ for purposes of confrontation”); cf. Bradley, supra note 47, at 
316, 323 (“[I]t seems obvious . . . that everyone who testifies for the prosecution, whether 
offering live or hearsay testimony, is a ‘witness’ against the defendant under the terms of the 
Sixth Amendment”). 
107 People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009). 
108 Id. at 66-67.  Bryant’s girlfriend testified that Bryant was not home at the time of the 
shooting.  Id.  Bryant’s first trial ended in a hung jury.  Id. 
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court excluded the statement, “we won’t have a trial.”109  In his opening 
remarks, the prosecutor told the jury that Covington’s statement was “[t]he 
most important piece of evidence you’ll hear during this trial” and urged the 
jurors to view the statement as the victim “speaking to you from the grave and 
telling you what happened . . . and telling you who’s responsible.”110  
Whatever one thinks of Bryant’s likely guilt (or the desirability of admitting 
Covington’s statement), it requires a true contortion of language to conclude 
that Covington was not one of the “witnesses against” Bryant.  Indeed, it 
would be more accurate, in light of the trial record, to say that Covington was 
the only witness against him.  As the prosecutor readily admitted, without 
Covington’s out-of-court statement, the case would have been dismissed.111 
Although there may be a temptation to attribute the Court’s strained textual 
analysis in Bryant to the lack of fidelity to Crawford bemoaned by Justice 
Scalia,112 a similar contortion of the constitutional text appears in Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Davis.  Typical of domestic violence cases,113 the 
prosecution’s case in Davis consisted of live testimony from police officers 
who did not observe the alleged assault.114  Only the victim’s answers to 
questions during a frantic (reverse) 911 call connected Davis to the offense.115  
In closing argument, defense counsel stressed this weakness, highlighting the 
absence of any eyewitness testimony to the assault.116  In response, the 
prosecutor relied on the victim’s out-of-court statements to fill the void: 
“[T]here was a person present [during the crime] . . . and although she is 
not here today to talk to you[,] she left you something better.  She left you 
her testimony on the day that this happened[;] . . . this shows that the 
 
109 Id. at 76. 
110 Id. (quoting the prosecutor). 
111 Id. 
112 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1171 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending 
that under Crawford, “this is an absurdly easy case,” yet reaching the opposite conclusion of 
the majority). 
113 Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay 
Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out-of-Court Statements As Substantive 
Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3-4 (2002) (explaining that “[n]on-cooperation by 
recantation or failure to appear at trial is an epidemic in domestic violence cases” and 
reporting estimates by domestic violence practitioners of eighty to ninety percent 
noncooperation); Orenstein, supra note 47, at 144; Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies 
and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 328 (2005).  
114 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 818 (2006). 
115 See State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 847 (Wash. 2005) (“The only evidence linking 
Davis to her injuries was the tape recording of the 911 call.”) 
116 Brief for Petitioner at 8, Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (No. 05-5224); Ross, supra note 17, at 
199. 
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defendant, Adrian Davis was at her home and assaulted her.  It is right 
here in her voice.”117 
Despite the prosecutor’s vivid rhetoric that the victim’s 911 call constituted her 
“testimony on the day that this happened,” the Supreme Court ruled that the 
victim was not a “witness against” Davis.118  Again, this conclusion ignores the 
“normal and ordinary” meaning of the pertinent terms.  The victim was, after 
all, the only person who linked Davis to the crime; without the recording of her 
“testimony on the day that this happened,” the prosecution had no case. 
C. The Confronation Right at the Time of the Framing 
The Davis opinion does not solely rely on Webster’s dictionary for its 
conclusion that out-of-court speakers whose nontestimonial statements are 
introduced at trial are not “witnesses” under the Sixth Amendment.  Davis 
reinforces its textual argument with a historical one.119  In the sentence 
immediately following the groundbreaking (if obtuse) core-perimeter statement 
quoted above, the Court adds: “We are not aware of any early American case 
invoking the Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to confrontation 
that did not clearly involve [testimonial statements].”120  The Court thus 
buttresses its textual argument with a historical claim: courts in the Framing 
era understood that only testimonial hearsay implicated the confrontation right. 
Unfortunately for the Davis Court, the historical argument fares no better 
than the textual one.  First, there is at least one early American case that the 
Court overlooks: the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr.121  Presiding over Burr’s trial, 
Chief Justice John Marshall deemed out-of-court statements of an alleged 
coconspirator inadmissible because the testimony was unconfronted, even 
though those statements appear to fall neatly into the nontestimonial 
category.122  Second, there is an explanation, other than a shared understanding 
 
117 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 8 (quoting the prosecutor); see also Ross, 
supra note 17, at 199. 
118 Davis, 547 U.S. at 829. 
119 Id. at 824. 
120 Id.   
121 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694). 
122 Id. at 193; see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of 
Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 228 (2005) (commenting that Crawford 
“completely ignored” this case); Roger W. Kirst, Confrontation Rules After Davis v. 
Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 635, 680 (2007) (criticizing Davis’s statement because “it is 
not a true statement about history” and citing the case of Aaron Burr where “Chief Justice 
Marshall sitting as a Circuit Justice excluded evidence of private conversations that were 
offered as co-conspirator statements”).  The majority and dissent in Crawford sparred over 
the significance of Burr, which makes its absence from the discussion in Davis particularly 
difficult to understand.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004); id. at 71 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).  Another case the Court might have 
considered on this point is King v. Brasier where a defendant was ruled improperly 
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of the confrontation right’s inapplicability, that fully explains the dearth of 
Framing-era American cases excluding nontestimonial statements: a widely 
accepted contemporaneous understanding that nontestimonial hearsay could 
not be used in criminal cases. 
Although disagreement on this point can be found,123 recent historical 
scholarship makes a compelling case that that at the time of the Framing, 
criminal courts consistently recognized only two hearsay exceptions: (1) an 
exception for sworn witness statements of unavailable witnesses taken 
pursuant to so-called Marian statutes (statements that were obviously 
“testimonial”); and (2) an exception for dying declarations (statements the 
post-Crawford opinions remove from the analytical framework as “sui 
generis”).124  Historical sources suggest that all other hearsay, including 
statements that the Davis majority would consider “nontestimonial” (for 
example, excited utterances), was generally regarded as inadmissible to prove 
a defendant’s guilt.125 
 
convicted based on a child’s statements to her mother.  King v. Brasier, (1779) 168 Eng. 
Rep. 202 (K.B.) 202; 1 Leach 199, 200.  The Davis Court suggests Brasier involved 
“testimonial” hearsay, Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, although the statements are certainly not 
“clearly” testimonial, particularly in light of the Court’s recent interpretation of that term in 
Bryant.  Admittedly, Brasier is an English case, but given the Supreme Court’s reliance on 
English cases throughout its modern confrontation jurisprudence, it seems questionable for 
the Court to suddenly invoke the distinction here.    
123 For example, Michael Polelle argues that “res gestae statements were used as hearsay 
exceptions against criminal defendants before and at the time of the adoption of the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Michael Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarations in a Post-Crawford 
World, 71 MO. L. REV. 285, 293 (2006).  To support his contention, Polelle cites three cases:  
Thompson v. Trevanion, King v. Gordon, and The Trial of John Horne Tooke.  Id. at 292-94, 
293 n.43.  Trevanion was a civil case, something Polelle recognizes.  Id. at 292 n.39; 
Thompson v. Trevanion, (1693) 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.) 179; Skin 402; see also Davies, 
supra note 15, at 452 (arguing, as well, that “framing-era Americans . . . were unlikely to 
have thought [Thompson] was authority for a spontaneous declaration or res gestae hearsay 
exception”).  King v. Gordon provides virtually no support as it appears to involve a very 
subtle manner of hearsay: repeated testimony, without apparent objection, that unknown 
members of an anti-Catholic mob sweeping through London cried out on various occasions, 
“‘No Popery’” and wore “blue cockades.”   See King v. Gordon, (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 372 
(K.B.) 374; 21 How. St. Tr. 485.  Tooke is similarly unenlightening in that the case report 
merely includes defense counsel’s reference to a letter admitted, without objection, on the 
ground that it was “an answer to an act which is charged against the prisoner” and so was 
“part of the res gesta.”  The Trial of John Horne Tooke, (1794) 25 How. St. Tr. 1, 440. 
124 Davies, supra note 15, at 417-18; cf. R. v Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352 
(K.B.) 353; 1 Leach 500, 503 (recognizing these “two . . . species” of admissible hearsay).  
For a summary of Marian statutes, see Davies, supra note 15, at 397-98 n.116, and Robert 
Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A Response to Professor Davies, 72 BROOK. 
L. REV. 493, 498 (2007).  
125 Davies, supra note 15, at 351, 452 (arguing that “framing-era evidence doctrine 
imposed a virtually total ban against using unsworn hearsay evidence to prove a criminal 
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Chief Justice Marshall’s remarks in the Aaron Burr trial support the notion 
that the Framers would have considered unconfronted, nontestimonial hearsay 
to be self-evidently inadmissible.  Excluding nontestimonial statements offered 
against Burr, the Chief Justice invoked the “rule of evidence which rejects 
mere hearsay testimony.”126  Marshall thought the rule’s wisdom obvious: 
I know not why a declaration in court should be unavailing, unless made 
upon oath, if a declaration out of court was to criminate others than him 
who made it; nor why a man should have a constitutional claim to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, 
made in his absence, may be evidence against him.127 
Other historical sources are in accord.  The 1769 edition of Gilbert’s treatise 
(cited by Justice Rehnquist in his Crawford concurrence) states: 
“Hearsay is no Evidence . . . though a Person Testify what he hath heard 
upon Oath, yet the Person who spake it was not upon Oath; . . . if the first 
Speech was without Oath, an Oath that there was such a Speech makes it 
no more than a bare speaking, and so of no Value in a Court of Justice, 
where all Things were determined under the Solemnities of an 
Oath . . . .”128  
Similar sentiments appear in William Hawkins’s influential Framing-era 
treatise, which emphasized that the defendant “hath no Opportunity of a cross 
Examination” when hearsay is introduced.129  Blackstone’s 1771 
Commentaries on the Laws of England states succinctly: “[N]o evidence of a 
discourse with another will be admitted, but the man himself must be 
produced.”130 
 
defendant’s guilt,” and most modern hearsay exceptions “had not yet been invented when 
the Bill of Rights was framed”); John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 
HARV. L. REV. 437, 456-57 (1904) (stating that from the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, “the writers upon the law assume[d]” that the prohibition on the introduction of 
out-of-court statements was “a settled doctrine,” based on the rationale that “statements used 
as testimony must be made where the maker can be subjected to cross-examination”).  For a 
discussion of historical support for a business records exception, see infra Part III.C. 
126 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 193.   
127 Id. (emphasis added). 
128 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 70 n.2 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in 
the judgment) (quoting SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 152 (3d ed., London, 
W. Owen 1769)). 
129 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 429-31 (4th ed., 
London, E. Richardson & C. Lintot 1762) (stating, under the heading, “How far Hearsay is 
Evidence,” that “what a Stranger has been heard to say is in Strictness no Manner of 
Evidence either for or against a Prisoner, not only because it is not upon Oath, but also 
because the other Side hath no Opportunity of a cross Examination; and therefore it seems a 
settled Rule, That it shall never be made use of but only by way of Inducement or 
Illustration of what is properly Evidence”). 
130 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 368 (4th ed., 
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The relevant historical sources referenced, in part, above and exhaustively 
chronicled elsewhere by Thomas Davies131 support a key underlying point: the 
Supreme Court drew precisely the wrong conclusion from the historical record.  
The more convincing explanation for the relative absence of early American 
decisions excluding nontestimonial hearsay is that there existed, at the time of 
the Framing, a widespread and largely “settled Rule”132 that unsworn, out-of-
court remarks (Justice Marshall’s “mere verbal declarations”) could not be 
used to convict a criminal defendant.133  Such a rule would explain the absence 
of Framing-era cases excluding or admitting nontestimonial hearsay; if a rule is 
widely settled, it will rarely need to be invoked, particularly in the sparse 
published records of Framing-era litigation. 
It is curious, after all, that the Davis Court framed its historical contention in 
terms of the absence of cases excluding nontestimonial hearsay.134  Clearly the 
strongest type of historical evidence for its supposition that nontestimonial 
hearsay was admissible in the Framing-era would have been a citation to a 
single case admitting such evidence.  Contrary to the Court’s supposition, the 
historical sources discussed above suggest that such a case would go against 
the prevailing understanding of the confrontation right and the Davis Court’s 
failure to identify even one such case is, consequently, quite telling.135 
The contention that hearsay was generally inadmissible in criminal trials of 
the Framing era should not be overstated.  Judicial records of the time period 
are uneven and incomplete, and even the sources noted above recognize areas 
 
Dublin, John Exshaw et al. 1771).  Blackstone notes some narrow exceptions that do not 
appear to contradict the general point: “yet in some cases (as in proof of any general 
customs, or matters of common tradition or repute) the courts admit of hearsay evidence, or 
an account of what persons deceased have declared in their life-time: but such evidence will 
not be received of any particular facts.”  Id. 
131 See generally Davies, supra note 15. 
132 HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 431; Wigmore, supra note 125, at 456-57. 
133 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 219-20 (1942) (explaining that “[b]y the end of the third 
decade of the eighteenth century,” hearsay “was generally rejected”); WIGMORE, supra note 
31, § 1364, at 26 (explaining that as of the end of the seventeenth century “the applicability 
of the hearsay rule to sworn statements in general, as well as to unsworn statements, is not 
questioned” and “[f]rom the beginning of the 1700s the writers upon the law assume it as a 
settled doctrine” based upon the justification that: “statements used as testimony must be 
made where the maker can be subjected to cross-examination”); Davies, supra note 15, at 
380-81. 
134 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 835-36 (2006). 
135 See Davies, supra note 15, at 377, 452 (explaining that Thompson v. Trevanion did 
not appear to support a contrary position, and stating that “no brief or opinion in Davis or 
Crawford identified even a single published framing-era case report that actually admitted 
an unsworn out-of-court statement that might now be described as ‘nontestimonial 
hearsay’”); Jonakait, supra note 122, at 228-29; Kirst, supra note 122, at 680 (arguing that 
the lack of cases noted in Davis might reflect that “there was no occasion to use the 
doctrine, or [that] those who might have used the doctrine were not the ones who knew 
about it”). 
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of gray.136  Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall suggests that jurists in the Framing 
era disagreed on the contours of the hearsay prohibition.137  In the same 
opinion quoted above, he acknowledged that “some exceptions” to the general 
rule prohibiting hearsay “have been introduced, concerning the extent of which 
a difference of opinion prevails.”138  Further, there is only so much that one 
can conclude about the nuances of hearsay doctrine from the abstract 
exhortations of treatise writers and a relative absence of pertinent caselaw.  As 
Justice Rehnquist argued in his Crawford concurrence, one of the primary 
characteristics of Framing-era evidence rules is their opacity.139  The rules 
were different in different courts, constantly evolving, and muddied by a 
pervasive insistence on the existence of a second-class category of (generally 
unsworn) quasi-evidence that could be admitted, but “use[d]” only as an 
“Inducement or Illustration of what is properly Evidence.”140 
The subtle inconsistencies and general messiness of the Framing-era 
historical record does not redeem the Davis Court, however.  The Court (which 
is surprisingly unanimous on this point) does not contend that the historical 
record is uneven, difficult to interpret, or opaque.141  A candid conclusion 
along those lines would permit a much more nuanced approach to 
nontestimonial hearsay – an approach the Davis Court rejected out of hand.  
 
136 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); Davies, 
supra note 15, at 424, 444, 447; John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of 
Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1172, 1190 (1996) 
(arguing that “the law of evidence,” including the hearsay rules, “hardened only in the last 
decades of the eighteenth century”); David Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 5 (emphasizing that hearsay doctrine in the eighteenth century was “less developed” 
than its modern-day counterpart).  Brasier provides an example of a case where a trial court 
permitted hearsay in a criminal case (and was then reversed on appeal), possibly revealing 
weakness in the common law hearsay prohibition.  See supra note 122. 
137 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 193. 
138 Id.  Justice Marshall cautioned “courts to be watchful of every inroad” into the “truly 
important” principle prohibiting unsworn evidence.  Id. 
139 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 72 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also Fisher, supra note 17, at 594 (recognizing uncertainty in determining 
evidence rules at the time of the Framing in “light of the scant reporting style of early 
English cases and courts’ general hostility at the time to admitting any hearsay evidence 
whatsoever”); Langbein, supra note 136 at 1180-81; cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“Under the common law, although the courts 
were far from consistent, out-of-court statements made by someone other than the accused 
and not taken under oath, unlike ex parte depositions or affidavits, were generally not 
considered substantive evidence upon which a conviction could be based.”). 
140
 HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 431; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 70-72 & n.1 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1367 at 19-20 
(discussing a line of doctrine that ran parallel to the “general rule of exclusion” that “a 
hearsay statement may be used as confirmatory or corroboratory of other testimony,” that 
died out by the end of the 1700s). 
141
 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 824 (2006); see also supra note 82.   
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Rather, the Court concluded that the historical record reflects a broad Framing-
era consensus that nontestimonial hearsay was admissible.142  On this point, the 
Supreme Court is simply wrong.  If, in fact, there was a consensus expressed at 
the time of the Framing, it was that unsworn hearsay, including nontestimonial 
hearsay, was generally inadmissible (not admissible) against criminal 
defendants. 
D. Summary 
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s arguments in Davis, the Sixth Amendment 
text does not compel a conclusion that nontestimonial statements fall outside 
the scope of the Confrontation Clause.  Under a straightforward textual 
reading, the phrase “witnesses against” encompasses all persons whose hearsay 
statements (testimonial or not) are relied on by the prosecution to prove a 
defendant’s guilt.  This conclusion holds whether the Sixth Amendment text is 
interpreted in light of common sense, historical sources, or, as the Court 
prefers, through the prism of Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary.  While the 
Framers likely viewed the introduction of unconfronted, testimonial statements 
as most alarming, the available evidence suggests they also feared the 
admission of unconfronted, nontestimonial statements.143  Consequently, the 
Confrontation Clause must be interpreted to apply not solely to “testimonial” 
hearsay, but to “nontestimonial” hearsay as well.  The balance of this Article 
explores how best to incorporate constitutional limits on the admission of 
nontestimonial hearsay into the Court’s jurisprudence. 
III. REPAIRING THE DOCTRINE: LIMITING THE ADMISSION OF 
NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY 
The preceding Parts map out two distinct aspects of Crawford-era 
Confrontation Clause doctrine: one aspect of the caselaw that significantly 
improves Roberts-era jurisprudence and another aspect that remains 
powerfully flawed.  This Part sketches a reform proposal intended to preserve 
what is right in the new doctrine while repairing what is wrong.  Importantly, 
while the proposal flows naturally from the historical and textual analysis 
discussed in Parts I and II, it is not justified on this ground alone.  Indeed, as 
the foregoing analysis suggests, neither the history nor text of the Sixth 
Amendment dictates any single approach to regulating nontestimonial hearsay 
– a concession the Supreme Court (and even Justices Thomas and Scalia) 
 
142 Davis, 547 U.S. at 824. 
143 Cf. Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 383 (“Thus while the historical record supports the 
conclusion that the Framers had a heightened concern about testimonial hearsay, it does not 
support a conclusion that the Framers neither had nor would have had concerns about other 
forms of hearsay.”); Mosteller, supra note 14, at 721 (“[I]t is unclear how the Framers 
would have reacted to a modern world where, as Rehnquist noted, hearsay is much more 
admissible and ordinarily given weight that likely would have appeared foreign to the 
Framers.”). 
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willingly made prior to Crawford.144  Rather, the proposal (like the historical 
and textual analysis itself) stems from the two underlying principles that most 
clearly animate the confrontation right, only one of which is currently captured 
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
The Court’s primary revision of Roberts-era doctrine – its insistence that 
out-of-court statements made with an eye toward litigation cannot be admitted 
absent confrontation – represents an essential manifestation of one of the two 
key principles underlying the confrontation right.  The government cannot 
consciously avoid cross-examination of its witnesses by procuring admissible, 
out-of-court substitutes for their testimony.145  The key conceptual flaw in the 
Court’s jurisprudence is its failure to recognize the second overarching 
confrontation principle: a preference for live-witness testimony, as opposed to 
hearsay, that applies regardless of the origins of any particular hearsay 
statement.146  Critically, this flaw appears to arise not from any reasoned 
disagreement with the second principle itself, but as collateral damage from the 
Court’s abrupt jurisprudential shift away from Roberts,147 and the erroneous 
historical and textual analysis detailed in Part II. 
As discussed below, the Supreme Court’s seemingly unconsidered retreat 
from a broad preference for live testimony can be remedied fairly easily.  The 
Court need only reintroduce, as a limit on nontestimonial hearsay, the feature 
of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence that once prominently enforced a 
preference for live testimony – an “unavailability” requirement.  Doing so 
would address the Court’s inexcusable neglect of nontestimonial hearsay and, 
at the same time, strengthen the underlying rationale for – and coherence of – 
modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
A. An Unavailability Requirement’s Remarkable Pedigree 
The notion that the Sixth Amendment embodies the Framers’ broad 
preference for live testimony is fairly uncontroversial.  The idea can be found 
 
144 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988).  Coy relies on Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence in California v. Green, in which he states: “[T]he Confrontation Clause comes 
to us on faded parchment.  History seems to give us very little insight into the intended 
scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.”  California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, echoed 
Justice Harlan’s sentiment in his concurrence in White.  See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 
359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There is virtually no evidence of what the drafters of 
the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.”); cf. Peter Westen, Confrontation and 
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
567, 568 (1978) (“[P]erhaps the most that should ever be expected from constitutional 
history is some guidance in narrowing the range of potential meanings.”). 
145 See supra Part I.B. 
146 See infra Part III.A. 
147 Roberts was a case that underscored the constitutional “preference” for live 
testimony.  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (“[T]he Clause reflects a preference for 
face-to-face confrontation at trial.”). 
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in the arguments of Confrontation Clause scholars,148 in the common law 
authorities that informed the Framers’ conceptions of the confrontation 
right,149 and throughout pre-Crawford jurisprudence.150  Traditionally, the 
preference manifests as an unavailability requirement: if the prosecution seeks 
to introduce a hearsay statement, the prosecutor must, at a minimum, 
demonstrate that the declarant is not available to testify in person. 
An unavailability requirement, as described above, is quite familiar to 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.151  For example, the Supreme Court 
reversed a conviction in the 1968 case of Barber v. Page because the 
prosecution failed to make “a good-faith effort” to obtain the live testimony of 
a witness whose preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury.152  
Emphasizing the importance of a showing of unavailability, even when the 
admission of an out-of-court statement seems otherwise sensible, the Court 
criticized the prosecution’s failure “to seek [the witness’s] presence” and 
stirringly declared that “[t]he right of confrontation may not be dispensed with 
so lightly.”153  Barber cites an earlier case where the Court went so far as to 
 
148 Friedman, supra note 3, at 243 (“[T]he whole point of the confrontation right is to 
bring testimony to trial.”); Jonakait, supra note 48, at 580 (describing “the confrontation 
clause’s . . . goal . . . of preserving personal examination in front of the jury so that the 
jurors can judge the believability of the witness”); Lilly, supra note 99, at 215. 
149 See, e.g., West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262 (1904) (stressing that the common law 
permitted certain hearsay depositions to be read, but only after it was shown “that the 
witness was at the time of the trial dead, insane, too ill ever to be expected to attend the trial, 
or kept away by the connivance of the defendant”); Lilly, supra note 99, at 212 (pointing out 
that “[a]lmost all of the eighteenth century American and English cases collected by 
Wigmore imposed on the government a stringent obligation to produce the declarant”); 
Wigmore, supra note 125, at 456-57. 
150 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (“[O]ur precedents establish that ‘the 
Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ a 
preference that ‘must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the 
necessities of the case.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63; Mattox v. 
United State, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895))); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); United 
States v. Dowdell, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (recognizing as the “general rule of law 
embodied in the Constitution” an intent “to secure the right of the accused to meet the 
witnesses face to face”).  The European Court of Human Rights has set forth as one of two 
minimum “requirements” for admission of hearsay against a criminal defendant that “there 
must be a good reason for the non-attendance of a witness.”  Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. 
United Kingdom, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 807, 809 (2012). 
151 See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393 (1986) (characterizing Roberts as part 
of “a long line of Confrontation Clause cases involving prior testimony” that held “that 
before such statements can be admitted the government must demonstrate that the declarant 
is unavailable”). 
152 Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25. 
153 Id. at 725. 
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reject the requisite showing of unavailability because the witness only became 
unavailable through “the negligence of the prosecution.”154 
Because the pre-Crawford Supreme Court cases applying an unavailability 
requirement consistently concerned one particular type of hearsay – testimony 
in a prior proceeding – it is not clear how broadly the Court viewed this 
requirement.  Searching for a theme in the Supreme Court precedents, 
however, Justice Harlan concluded in 1970 that “the availability of the 
witness” was the “uppermost consideration” in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence.155  Synthesizing prior caselaw, the Court’s opinion ten years 
later in Roberts followed suit, highlighting unavailability as a threshold 
Confrontation Clause requirement.156  Roberts explained that the Confrontation 
Clause’s “preference for face-to-face accusation, . . . establishes a rule of 
necessity,” which requires that in the “usual case,” the “prosecution must either 
produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it 
wishes to use against the defendant.”157  For a brief time under Roberts, at least 
in the “usual case,” only after the prosecution met its burden of demonstrating 
unavailability could a judicial determination of reliability stand in for the 
constitutional requirement of confrontation.158 
The broad unavailability principle announced in Roberts faded quickly.  Six 
years after Roberts, the Supreme Court in United States v. Inadi endorsed the 
introduction of a coconspirator’s hearsay statement despite the apparent 
 
154 Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900). 
155 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 183 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. 
Imwinkelried, supra note 40, at 532-36 (discussing the “checkered history” of an 
unavailability requirement in the Supreme Court’s late twentieth-century decisions); Laird 
C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional 
Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665, 670 (1986) (recognizing that “[t]he 
requirement of showing unavailability or producing the hearsay declarant for cross-
examination at trial has been a recurring theme in two lines of Supreme Court decisions 
extending back to the nineteenth century,” but stipulating that the cases primarily deal with 
prior testimony and so “do not provide authority for the sweeping unavailability requirement 
set forth in Roberts”).  
156 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (explaining that a “general approach to the 
problem is discernible” from the Court’s prior opinions and attempting to outline that 
approach). 
157 Id.; see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 865 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Our Confrontation Clause conditions for the admission of hearsay have long included a 
‘general requirement of unavailability’ of the declarant.”). 
158 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (“The second [reliability] aspect operates once a witness 
is shown to be unavailable.”); Stevens v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(“A hearsay statement is admissible for purposes of the Confrontation Clause only if the 
declarant is unavailable and the hearsay statement appears reliable.” (citing Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56)).  In addition to its explicit reference to the requirement of unavailability as the first 
of two tests for admissibility under the Confrontation Clause, a section of the Roberts 
opinion is devoted to explaining the nuances of establishing unavailability.  Roberts, 448 
U.S. at 74-75. 
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availability of the coconspirator to testify.159  The majority scoffed at “the 
radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the 
government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable.”160  Shortly 
after Inadi, the Court delivered the coup de grace.  In White v. Illinois, the 
Court stated that although Roberts “used language that might suggest that the 
Confrontation Clause generally requires that a declarant either be produced at 
trial or be found unavailable before his out-of-court statement may be admitted 
into evidence, such an expansive reading of the Clause is negated by our 
subsequent decision in Inadi.”161 
To justify its elimination of a central prong of Roberts’s Confrontation 
Clause analysis, the White Court pointed not to constitutional text or history, 
but to practicality.  The majority pontificated that “there is little benefit, if any, 
to be accomplished by imposing an ‘unavailability rule.’”162  Such a rule, the 
Court explained, was not “likely to produce much testimony that adds 
meaningfully to the trial’s truth-determining process” because the prosecution 
would presumably produce any persons whose testimony would help its case, 
and the defendant could subpoena declarants helpful to the defense.163  The 
Court added that the unavailability rule was “likely to impose substantial 
additional burdens on the fact-finding process” by forcing the prosecution to 
 
159 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986).  While the majority suggested that it 
was faithful to Roberts, the dissent harshly criticized the retreat as “a giant leap” from 
precedent.  Id. at 401 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 102 
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the declarant “was plainly available to 
the State” and may have “willingly testified”).   
160 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.   
161 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992).  Roberts itself arguably set the stage for 
this disavowal in a footnote.  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7 (stating that “[a] demonstration of 
unavailability, however, is not always required” and citing Dutton v. Evans as an example of 
such a circumstance where “the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that 
it did not require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness”). 
162 White, 502 U.S. at 354. 
163 Id. at 354-55.  As others, including the post-Crawford Court, have noted, it is 
insufficient as an interpretive matter to say that the defendant’s right to compel the 
appearance of witnesses “in his favor” remedies any deprivation of his right to confront 
prosecution witnesses.  The compulsory process right is distinct from the confrontation 
right, and cannot be sensibly viewed as a substitute for that right, unless one views the 
Confrontation Clause as mere surplusage.  Friedman, supra note 50, at 1037.  Further, the 
Confrontation Clause states the defendant “shall enjoy” the right to “be confronted,” a 
phrasing that can only mean that the defendant need do nothing to satisfy this right.  Id. at 
1036; cf. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (“[T]he Confrontation 
Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to 
bring those adverse witnesses into court.”).  As a practical matter, the vast chasm of 
resources (and oftentimes energy) between prosecution and defense makes the defense’s 
ability to subpoena witnesses an even less palatable means of enforcing the confrontation 
right.  See Jonakait, supra note 48, at 616 (criticizing the Court’s practical arguments 
against permitting confrontation). 
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“locate and keep continuously available each declarant, even when neither the 
prosecution nor the defense has any interest in calling the witness to the 
stand.”164  Accordingly, White confined Roberts’s unavailability requirement 
to the specific circumstances of that case – where the prosecution sought to 
introduce an absent witness’s testimony from a prior judicial proceeding.165 
White’s focus on practicality obscured the fact that a requirement that the 
prosecution demonstrate the declarant’s unavailability prior to introducing 
hearsay was not some idiosyncratic invention of the Roberts majority.  Instead, 
the historical seeds of this requirement can be found as far back as the trial of 
Sir Walter Raleigh – a not insignificant point, given the Supreme Court’s 
recent assertion that the “basic purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to 
‘targe[t]’ the sort of ‘abuses’ exemplified at the notorious treason trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh.”166 
The evidence introduced at Raleigh’s trial consisted primarily of a written 
confession of Raleigh’s associate, Lord Cobham, who was imprisoned 
nearby.167  Raleigh, suspecting Cobham would, if confronted, recant his 
accusations, futilely implored the tribunal to bring Cobham before it: 
[M]y Lords, I claim to have my accuser brought here face to face to 
speak . . . .  If you proceed to condemn me by bare inferences, without an 
oath, without a subscription, without witnesses, upon a paper accusation, 
you try me by the Spanish inquisition.  If my accuser were dead or 
abroad, it were something; but he liveth, and is in this very house.168 
 
164 White, 502 U.S. at 355.  As noted below, this criticism can be partially defused 
through a notice and demand requirement that would require the defense to indicate its 
desire to require live testimony from certain witnesses prior to trial.  See infra notes 241-242 
and accompanying text. 
165 White, 502 U.S. at 354 (“Roberts stands for the proposition that unavailability 
analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged 
out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.”).  Some 
commentators suggest that Roberts’s unavailability requirement survived in a slightly 
broader form.  See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 14, at 694 & n.28 (arguing that the 
unavailability requirement after White “applied only to a limited class of hearsay statements 
and most clearly only to prior testimony”). 
166 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 50 (2004) (stating that “the founding-era rhetoric decried” the “practices that the Crown 
deployed in notorious treason cases like Raleigh’s” and “[t]he Sixth Amendment must be 
interpreted with this focus in mind”); see also id. at 44 (relating that one of Raleigh’s judges 
later lamented that “the justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by the 
condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kirkpatrick, 
supra note 84, at 378 (“The notorious trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 is an important part 
of the background of the Confrontation Clause, and was cited repeatedly by Justice Scalia in 
Crawford as well as in Davis.”). 
167 Cobham implicated Raleigh both in letters and ex parte pretrial examinations.  See 
Mosteller, supra note 14, at 691 n.15. 
168 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 418-19 (London, Charles Knight, Pall Mall East 
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As the emphasized sentence suggests, Raleigh viewed witness availability as a 
critical component of the confrontation right.  In another report of the trial, 
Raleigh demurs to the judges’ resistance to his request for confrontation, 
stating: “Indeed where the Accuser is not to be had conveniently, I agree with 
you; but here my Accuser may; he is alive, and in the house.”169 
Fighting for his life, Raleigh did not assail the prosecution simply because it 
relied on Cobham’s out-of-court statements. Raleigh emphasized the 
prosecutor’s failure to bring before the court a witness who was “in this very 
house.”170  Raleigh even concedes that a trial by affidavit might be palatable 
were his accuser “not to be had conveniently” because “dead or abroad.”  To 
Raleigh, and presumably his intended audience, Cobham’s ready availability to 
testify was a critical component of the Crown’s injustice.171 
While Raleigh’s judges ridiculed his plea for the live testimony of an 
available witness,172 his argument, not their rejection of it, stood the test of 
time.  William Hawkins’s 1721 treatise Pleas of the Crown explains: 
There are many Instances in the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King 
James I, wherein the Depositions of absent Witnesses were allowed as 
Evidence in Treason and Felony, even where it did not appear but that the 
Witnesses might have been produced viva voce.  And it was adjudged in 
the Earl of Strafford’s Trial, that where Witnesses could not be produced 
viva voce, by Reason of Sickness, &c. their Depositions might be read for 
or against the Prisoner on a Trial of High Treason, but not where they 
might have been produced in Person.173 
Thus, the injustice of allowing the prosecution to rely on unconfronted hearsay 
as a matter of choice was recognized well before the Framing, and outlawed in 
the Earl of Strafford’s trial in 1680.  This was seventy years too late for 
Raleigh, but well in advance of the drafting of the Sixth Amendment.  In fact, 
the dispositive nature of unavailability at the Framing is well established in the 
 
1832) (emphasis added). 
169 The Trial Of Sir Walter Raleigh (1603), in 2 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF 
STATE TRIALS 1, 19 (London, R. Bagshaw et al. 1809) [hereinafter COBBETT’S]. 
170 JARDINE, supra note 168, at 419. 
171 Cf. Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s “Cross-
Examination Rule”: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 558 n.4 (2007) (“[T]he 
admission of out-of-court statements by a person who was available to be called as a witness 
was one of the notorious defects in Sir Walter Raleigh’s 1603 trial.”). 
172 For example, Justice Warburton responded:  “I marvel, Sir Walter, that you being of 
such experience and wit, should stand on this point; for many horse-stealers should escape if 
they may not be condemned without witnesses.”  JARDINE, supra note 168, at 421. 
173 HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 430; see also WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1367 at 20-24 
(describing the evolution of the rule that “the deponent ought to be produced if he can be”); 
Davies, supra note 15, at 469 n.111 (quoting this passage and concluding that “Hawkins 
indicated that the reading of depositions of available witnesses in treason trials was banned 
starting with Strafford’s trial in 1680”). 
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historical record.  In an article criticizing Crawford and its progeny, Thomas 
Davies concludes that, at the time of the Framing, “out-of-court statements of 
available witnesses were never admissible as evidence of a defendant’s 
guilt.”174  Decades earlier, Graham Lilly reached a similar conclusion, 
explaining that “a prevailing principle threads throughout” the eighteenth 
century Anglo-American caselaw: “if the declarant was living and could be 
produced, he must appear at trial.”175  Consequently, Lilly concluded, as this 
Article maintains, that the Framers intended the Confrontation Clause to 
“function[] as a rule of preference requiring the presence of the declarant, if 
available.”176 
Despite the prominent role of history in the Supreme Court’s new 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and the privileged place that jurisprudence 
assigns to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, the Court’s treatment of witness 
unavailability has not changed since White.  Under Crawford and its progeny, 
unavailability is relegated to the same trivial role as in White, functioning as a 
limit on the admission of prior, cross-examined testimony (for example, a 
deceased witness’s cross-examined testimony in a previous trial) and nothing 
more.177  For all practical purposes, the broad Sixth Amendment “preference 
for face-to-face accusation” identified in Roberts retains no place in current 
doctrine.  It is likely no coincidence that when Crawford recounts Raleigh’s 
protestations of the Crown’s injustice, it omits Raleigh’s references to 
Cobham’s availability.178  Raleigh pointedly emphasized that his absent 
accuser was not “dead or abroad” but “liveth, and is in this very house.”179  
The Crawford Court deemed this complaint too insignificant to mention. 
B. Unavailability As a Prerequisite to Admitting Nontestimonial Statements 
The historical pedigree and Supreme Court precedent enforcing an 
unavailability requirement should make such a requirement relatively attractive 
to the current Court as a mechanism for restricting nontestimonial hearsay.  
More importantly, an unavailability requirement would reintroduce one of the 
confrontation right’s essential purposes to modern doctrine – enforcing a 
preference for live testimony over hearsay, regardless of the particular species 
of hearsay at issue. 
This proposal does not require another seismic shift in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. The courts can neatly overlay a Sixth Amendment preference 
for live-witness testimony onto modern jurisprudence, by supplementing the 
existing bar to unconfronted “testimonial” statements with a requirement that a 
 
174 Davies, supra note 15, at 395-96, 395 n.111. 
175 Lilly, supra note 99, at 212-15. 
176 Id. at 215. 
177 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (specifying identical requirements for admission of 
“former testimony”). 
178 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004). 
179 JARDINE, supra note 168, at 418-19. 
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prosecutor offering an unconfronted “non-testimonial” statement demonstrate 
the witness’s unavailability.  For the historical and practical reasons identified 
in the preceding Parts, the introduction of testimonial statements would 
continue to trigger the strictest constitutional protections.180  These statements, 
as Crawford holds, should not be admitted at trial absent an opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant.181  Confrontation Clause doctrine need not restrict 
nontestimonial statements as severely.  While nontestimonial hearsay can 
constitute powerful evidence, there is, by definition, no danger that the 
prosecution will consciously elicit such statements to deprive the defendant of 
cross-examination.182  Once government malfeasance drops out of the 
equation, only one of the confrontation right’s core policies remains – the 
preference for live testimony.  This preference can be enforced through an 
unavailability requirement. 
Permitting nontestimonial statements when there is no alternative (that is, 
when the declarant is unavailable) does not violate the Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation.  The statements, by definition, arose independently of the 
litigation.  The defendant’s ability to confront the witness is lost by 
happenstance.  It is the witness’s unavailability, not government scheming, that 
is to blame.183  At this point, the Sixth Amendment preference for live-witness 
 
180 Cf. Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A 
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 561 (1992) (“Hearsay 
statements procured by agents of the prosecution or police should . . . stand on a different 
footing than hearsay created without governmental intrusion.”); Roger W. Kirst, The 
Procedural Dimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REV. 485, 493 (1987) (arguing 
that unavailability alone is not a sufficient Confrontation Clause test because “the critical 
time is not only the time the evidence is offered by the prosecution, but also the time the 
hearsay is created by the government for the prosecution”).  Historical support for the 
proposition that unavailability is not alone sufficient to dispense with confrontation of 
testimonial statements can be found in King v. Dingler, (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383; 2 Leach 
561.  In that case, a husband stabbed his wife numerous times resulting in her death.  A 
magistrate took a statement under oath from the victim, but the court excluded the 
statement, rejecting the Crown’s argument that the statement “was the best evidence that the 
nature of the case would afford.”  Id. at 383. 
181 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36. 
182 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1154-57 (2011) (explaining that when 
statements are elicited by government agents for purposes of establishing facts for purposes 
of investigation and, ultimately, litigation, they are “testimonial”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 
n.7 (noting that the “[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of testimony” 
presents a “unique potential for prosecutorial abuse”).  Of course, police or prosecutors 
could falsify the origins of a statement to satisfy the requirements of the doctrine, but this 
danger cannot be avoided through doctrine.  If the authorities are willing to fabricate 
evidence, they will avoid any doctrinal hurdles.  
183 Cf. Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An 
Adversary-Oriented Approach, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 503 (1998) (criticizing hearsay 
prohibition generally in a similar context, and asking why, if “[t]he proponent did not create 
the evidence, but took it as found,” a “fair fight” would “demand exclusion for lack of cross-
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testimony must bow to “the necessities of the case.”184  The prosecution played 
no conscious role in eliciting the statements and is, consequently, not 
responsible for their presentation at trial in less than ideal form.  The defendant 
who objects to the introduction of unconfronted, nontestimonial evidence when 
the declarant is unavailable demands the impossible.  Just as the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process to obtain “witnesses in his 
favor” does not require the government to produce unavailable witnesses (so 
long as it played no role in causing their unavailability),185 the right to confront 
the “witnesses against him” does not necessitate exclusion of out-of-court 
statements of witnesses who cannot be brought to court (so long as the 
statements were not elicited for purposes of litigation).186 
The two-tiered framework set forth above would allow the Court to offer 
significant, although not absolute, Confrontation Clause protection to 
defendants who, as in Davis and Bryant, face nontestimonial accusations by 
absent witnesses.  Specifically, this protection would consist of a requirement 
that the prosecution demonstrate the unavailability of the out-of-court speaker 
whose statement will be introduced.187  The precise measure of 
 
examination when, through no fault of either party, it is not possible to produce better 
evidence in the form of the declarant”).  To the extent the government is responsible for a 
witness’s unavailability, the government would forfeit the ability to rely on unavailability.  
See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900) (holding that the government cannot 
invoke a witness’s unavailability if the witness’s “absence was due to the negligence of the 
prosecution”). 
184 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (“[O]ur precedents establish that ‘the 
Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ a 
preference that ‘must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the 
necessities of the case.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 
243 (1895)); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243-44; Westen, supra note 144, at 600 (“The state fully 
exhausts its obligations under the confrontation clause once it produces its evidence in best 
available form.”). 
185 United States v. Ballesteros-Acuna, 527 F.2d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he 
Government is ‘under no obligation to look for’ a defendant’s ‘witnesses, in the absence of a 
showing that such witnesses were made unavailable through the suggestion, procurement, or 
negligence’ of the Government.” (quoting Ferrari v. United States, 244 F.2d 132, 141 (9th 
Cir. 1957))); see also United States v. Lee, 906 F.2d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); cf. 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (holding that defendant was “denied his right 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily 
denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable 
of testifying”). 
186 See Westen, supra note 144, at 596 (arguing that the confrontation right should be 
interpreted to treat unavailable witnesses in the same manner as the compulsory process 
right). 
187 Shortly after Crawford, Robert Mosteller advocated reviving Roberts to provide 
“weaker” constitutional protections for “problematic,” but nontestimonial hearsay – 
specifically, any out-of-court statement that “may be regarded as suspect either because it is 
facially unreliable or because it is only barely outside the definition of testimonial 
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“unavailability” can be determined by reference to existing case law – the 
concept is defined at length in Roberts itself188 – as unavailability already plays 
a role in determining the admissibility of prior, cross-examined testimony 
under Crawford.189 
 
statements.”   Mosteller, supra note 14, at 722.  Mosteller’s advocacy for “a guarantee that 
helps force confrontation or excludes particularly problematic hearsay statements from a 
person whom the defendant cannot confront” sounds a common theme with this Article.  Id. 
at 712.  The instant proposal does not incorporate Roberts’s test for reliability, but does 
“force confrontation” in some circumstances where it would be otherwise abandoned.  Id.   
Tom Lininger seems to have endorsed a similar approach in a brief symposium essay that 
cited Oregon case law with approval.  See Lininger, supra note 15, at 406 (citing Oregon 
courts’ requirement of unavailability as an “attractive alternative” to the Supreme Court’s 
abandonment of Confrontation Clause protection for nontestimonial hearsay – a requirement 
that limits “the gamesmanship of the pre-Crawford era, when prosecutors called police to 
recount victims’ hearsay statements even when the victims were available to testify”).  
Lininger has advocated elsewhere for legislatures to amend the hearsay rules to require 
unavailability as a prerequisite to the admission of nontestimonial hearsay.  See Tom 
Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 307 (2006).  
In contrast to the arguments presented here, Lininger appears to concede that “originalist 
constitutional interpretation” supports the conclusion reached in Davis, but he objects on 
policy grounds.  Id. at 288 (asserting that the Court’s conclusion in Davis “may accurately 
reflect the Framers’ understanding of then-existing law, but originalist constitutional 
interpretation does not necessarily make good policy”).  
Oregon adheres to a state-constitution-based unavailability requirement for hearsay 
admitted against a criminal defendant that appears to result from a refusal to follow White’s 
divergence from Roberts.  See State v. Moore, 49 P.3d 785, 792 (Or. 2002); State v. 
Campbell, 705 P.2d 694, 706 (Or. 1985).  Hawaii follows a state-constitution-based 
requirement that nontestimonial hearsay satisfy Roberts.  See State v. Fields, 168 P.3d 955, 
968 (Haw. 2007).  Other jurisdictions continue to apply Roberts to nontestimonial hearsay, 
but whether they are simply carelessly following pre-Crawford case law or implementing a 
state-constitution-based requirement is often unclear.  See Sharifi v. State, 993 So. 2d 907, 
930 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (suggesting that Roberts-era analysis continues to apply to 
nontestimonial hearsay); People v. Hagos, 250 P.3d 596, 624 (Colo. App. 2009); State v. 
Brocca, 979 So. 2d 430, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Dewitz, 212 P.3d 1040, 
1050 (Mont. 2009); State v. Ramirez, 936 A.2d 1254, 1266 (R.I. 2007); State v. Kaufman, 
711 S.E.2d 607, 621 & n.31 (W. Va. 2011); see also Stinski v. State, 691 S.E.2d 854, 868 & 
n.2 (Ga. 2010) (applying Roberts analysis to nontestimonial hearsay, but acknowledging 
that the basis for doing so has been “undermined”). 
188 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (“‘[A] witness is not “unavailable” for 
purposes of the . . . exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial 
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968))); see also Hardy v. Cross, 
132 S. Ct. 490, 493-95 (2011) (reviewing case law defining “unavailability” for purposes of 
the Confrontation Clause). 
189 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004).  “Unavailability” is also a 
component of some standard hearsay exceptions.  See FED. R. EVID. 804. 
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If the prosecution is unable to demonstrate unavailability, it must either call 
the witness at trial, or forgo the opportunity to introduce the witness’s 
nontestimonial hearsay.  This requirement would revive the Sixth Amendment 
preference for live-witness testimony, echoing the short-lived command of 
Roberts that in the “usual case,” the “prosecution must either produce, or 
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to 
use against the defendant.”190 
Little need be said about the benefits of live-witness testimony in an 
adversary system.  Apart from a rare deviation in White,191 the judicial reports 
fawn over cross-examination of live witnesses as an essential element of a fair 
trial.  The Supreme Court summarizes these sentiments in California v. Green, 
stating that such testimony 
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath – thus 
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against 
the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to 
submit to cross-examination, the “greatest legal engine ever invented for 
the discovery of truth”; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the 
defendant’s fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his 
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.192 
Confrontation furthers other important goals as well, including fostering both 
the reality and perception of procedural fairness.193  This is because, as Tom 
Lininger explains, confrontation is not only “a means to an end, but an end in 
itself,” and therefore of value “even when [its] utility” in a particular instance 
“may appear negligible.”194 
C. A Historical Exception for Business Records and Analogous Hearsay 
While the unavailability requirement proposed in this Article remedies the 
key analytical flaw in modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, it also 
raises a new (albeit minor) problem that must be addressed.  Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence has long recognized the admissibility of certain, largely 
non-controversial, hearsay even when the declarant is technically available.  
For example, both Roberts and Crawford gave wide latitude to the admission 
of business records and analogous hearsay.  Under Roberts (after White), 
business records, public records, and the like were generally admissible 
regardless of the availability of the out-of-court declarant because they fell 
 
190 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
191 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 (1992). 
192 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (footnote omitted) (quoting WIGMORE, 
supra note 28, § 1367). 
193 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (“The perception that confrontation is 
essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it.”). 
194 Lininger, supra note 15, at 408. 
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within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.195  Under Crawford, such evidence is 
similarly admissible regardless of witness availability because it is not 
testimonial.196 
By reintroducing constitutional limits on the admissibility of all hearsay and 
tying these limits to witness availability, the framework proposed in this 
Article creates a need for a mechanism to admit uncontroversial business 
records and analogous hearsay.197  The prosecution should not be blocked, for 
example, from proving the amount of money in an embezzler’s bank account 
by a constitutional mandate that the prosecution produce every (available) 
bank employee who entered a credit or debit to the account.198 
There are a variety of ways to approach the admissibility of routine business 
and public records under an availability-focused Confrontation Clause.199  
Perhaps the cleanest approach is to rely on the same analysis that Crawford 
 
195 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8. 
196 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (recognizing historical evidence of 
admission of business records, but asserting that such records “by their nature were not 
testimonial”); cf. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 n.9 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009). 
197 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 155, at 667 n.12 (“[A] showing of unavailability of the 
declarant is not possible with respect to many types of business and official records, yet 
production of the declarant would negate the utility of the exception.”).  This difficulty was 
apparently partially to blame for Justice Harlan’s abandonment of an availability-focused 
theory of the Confrontation Clause.  See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor raised the concern at oral argument in White as a 
strike against any doctrinal unavailability requirement.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 
supra note 68 (“I suppose if you were correct, then it wouldn’t even be possible to offer 
business records in any criminal case.”). 
198 Cf. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 988 n.25b (1942) (quoting a memo written by 
the Attorney General that claims courts’ failure to liberalize the business records exception 
caused “[t]he Government in a number of instances [to be] handicapped in the prosecution 
of criminal cases” and providing, as an example, a case where “the Government was 
prevented from [introducing] entries in books of a bank . . . unless the specific bookkeeper 
who made an entry could identify it” – something that “was impossible in view of the fact 
that the bank employed 18 bookkeepers, and since the entries were made by bookkeeping 
machines, no one bookkeeper could recall which entries were made by him”); FED. R. EVID. 
803(6) advisory committee’s note (articulating desirability of permitting introduction of 
business records without “the requirement of producing as witnesses, or accounting for the 
nonproduction of, all participants in the process of gathering, transmitting, and recording 
information”). 
199 Scholarly proposals of alternative approaches to the Confrontation Clause often 
advocate special treatment for business records and analogous hearsay.  See Jonakait, supra 
note 48, at 605 (suggesting a special exception for business records that would operate on a 
case-by-case basis depending on whether “the cross-examination of the business declarant 
might affect [the jury’s] evaluation of the hearsay”); Westen, supra note 144, at 617-18 
(excepting from proposed availability-centered Confrontation Clause framework declarants 
that “the defendant could not reasonably be expected to wish to examine”). 
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applies to dying declarations.  In Crawford, the Court recognized that many 
dying declarations would qualify as “testimonial” statements.200  Yet, the Court 
highlighted the existence of common law “authority” for admitting such 
statements and the absence of any indication that the Framers thought the Sixth 
Amendment eliminated the venerable dying declaration hearsay exception.201  
Consequently, the Court all but endorsed a sui generis exception to the 
confrontation right for dying declarations on “historical grounds.”202 
The historical record also supports an exception to the Sixth Amendment 
preference for live-witness testimony in the case of certain business and public 
records.  In fact, the Court has already laid some of the necessary groundwork.  
Although it never explains their significance to the Crawford framework, the 
majority in Melendez-Diaz recognized three “early common-law cases” that 
permitted the admission of “records prepared for the administration of an 
entity’s affairs” in criminal trials despite the absence of confrontation.203  The 
 
200 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
201 Id. 
202 Id.; see also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1177 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358, 361-62 (2008).  Although the Court has 
yet to rule on this question, it appears willing to endorse a historical exception for 
unconfronted, dying declarations.  See Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying 
Declarations and Modern Confrontation Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411, 1414, 
1441 (predicting that “the Court will hold that dying declarations are admissible as an 
exception to the Confrontation Clause even when testimonial”).  In early Confrontation 
Clause cases, the Court confidently proclaimed the admissibility of dying declarations in 
dicta.  See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899) (“This exception was well 
established before the adoption of the Constitution, and was not intended to be abrogated.”); 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).  The Court has also not addressed the 
contours of this dying declaration exception.  The Court might interpret the exception to 
allow the prosecution to introduce testimonial hearsay in lieu of an available live witness in 
one unlikely scenario – if the statement qualifies as a dying declaration, but the declarant did 
not die.  The arguments advanced in this Article would support a requirement that the 
prosecution call the witness in such a case.  Cf. Giles, 554 U.S. at 358 (describing the 
common law exception as encompassing “declarations made by a speaker who was both on 
the brink of death and aware that he was dying”); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (conditioning 
admission of a dying declaration on unavailability). 
203 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321 n.7 (2009) (noting cases that 
permitted the introduction of “records prepared for the administration of an entity’s affairs,” 
such as a “ship’s muster-book,” a church “vestry book,” and a “prison logbook”); Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 56 (acknowledging “business records” as a hearsay exception that was “well 
established by 1791” and explaining that the exception dealt with statements that “by their 
nature were not testimonial”).  Some scholars question the Supreme Court’s assumption 
(shared apparently by all the Justices) that English cases shed light on the American 
understanding of the right to confrontation.  See, e.g., Jonakait, supra note 19, at 620-21.  
This challenge certainly has some merit as the Framers presumably sought rights beyond 
those provided by the King of England.  English sources, however, are still relevant to the 
inquiry, if for no other reason than to suggest a baseline:  it is likely safe to assume that the 
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Court distinguished the records admitted in those cases from a chemist’s 
affidavit swearing to a substance’s narcotic properties on the obvious ground 
that the latter was prepared for litigation and thus did not satisfy either the 
historical or modern conception of a business or public record.204  The majority 
and dissenting opinions in Melendez-Diaz also recognized that American 
courts in the Framing era permitted “a clerk’s certificate authenticating an 
official record – or a copy thereof – for use as evidence” in criminal cases.205  
According to the majority, “[a] clerk could by affidavit authenticate or provide 
a copy of an otherwise admissible record, but could not . . . create a record for 
the sole purpose of providing evidence against a defendant.”206  The Melendez-
Diaz Court’s recognition of common law cases admitting unconfronted 
business and public records – so long as the records were not created for 
purposes of litigation – implies an openness to a historical exception for 
analogous evidence in the modern era. 
Melendez-Diaz provides almost no description of the cited business records 
cases, but a brief review confirms their potential applicability.  In King v. 
Rhodes, a prisoner charged with forging John Thompson’s will objected to 
admission of a ship’s muster book with the entry: “John Thompson, an able 
seaman, died 22 August 1739, at Turtle Bay.”207  The prosecutor responded 
that “it was the constant course and uninterrupted practice of the Court to 
admit the entry in the muster-book, after it had been authenticated by the Clerk 
who signed it, as full evidence of the fact.”208  The English Court seemingly 
agreed, overruling the objection and, in so doing, citing another case 
(Fitzgerald and Lee) in which “a muster-book was admitted as evidence of the 
same kind of fact.”209 
In King v. Aickles, a trial court admitted a “daily book . . . containing entries 
of the names of all the debtors and criminals who are brought into [Newgate] 
prison, and the times when they are discharged” to prove that a convict, 
Aickles, prematurely returned from exile.210  The daily book was presented to 
 
protections the Framers envisioned were at least equivalent to those already provided in 
English courts.  Cf. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 (“We are bound to interpret the Constitution in 
the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as reaching out for new 
guaranties of the rights of the citizen, but as securing to every individual such as he already 
possessed as a British subject . . . .”). 
204 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321 (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)). 
205 See id. at 322; id. at 347 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“During the Framers’ era copyists’ 
affidavits were accepted without hesitation by American courts.”). 
206 Id. at 322-23 (majority opinion); see also Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 
330-31 (1911). 
207 King v. Rhodes, (1742) 168 Eng. Rep. 115 (K.B.) 115; 1 Leach 24, 25. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 115-16 (citing King v. Fitzgerald and Lee, (1741) 168 Eng. Rep. 113 (K.B.) 
113; 1 Leach 20, 20-21). 
210 King v. Aickles, (1785) 168 Eng. Rep. 297 (K.B.) 298; 1 Leach 390, 391.  Aickles’s 
sentence for grand larceny was commuted on condition that he transport himself overseas, 
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the court by Mr. Newman, “clerk of the papers of the prison,” and it was 
recognized that the “entries were not made from Mr. Newman’s own 
knowledge of the facts,” but from the hearsay statements of “turnkeys.”211  The 
court overruled the prisoner’s objection to these “entries made entirely from 
hearsay and information.”212 
In King v. Martin,213 a criminal libel case, the trial court permitted the 
prosecution to introduce a vestry book that recorded the affairs of a parish, 
commenting that “[t]he books of the Bank of England, and of other public 
companies are evidence to a great variety of purposes.”214  The report contains 
the following footnote: “So corporation books, concerning the public 
government of a city or town, when they have been publicly kept, and the 
entries have been made by a proper officer, are received as evidence of the 
facts contained in them.”215 
 
within fourteen days of discharge from prison, for a period of seven years.  Id. at 297.  The 
evidence reflected Aickles’ capture in England a mere two months after his discharge, 
presumably violating the condition of commutation (assuming, of course, that the record 
accurately evidenced his date of discharge).  Id. at 298. 
211 Id.  The judges distinguished the prison log book from “the books or memorandums 
of a tradesman,” by emphasizing the clerk’s status as a “public officer recording a public 
transaction” with “no private interest whatsoever in this book.”  Id.; see also Brief for 
Respondent at 36-37, Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305 (No. 07-591) (citing cases).   
212 Aickles, 168 Eng. Rep. at 298; see also White v. United States, 164 U.S. 100, 104 
(1896) (citing, inter alia, Aickles in rejecting an objection to the admission of jail records).  
White adds: “In speaking of entries in books which are evidence in and of themselves, 
Greenleaf mentions many kinds of such entries, and among them he includes prison 
registers, and cites the cases of Rex v. Aickles and Salte v. Thomas as authority.”  White, 164 
U.S. at 104 (citations omitted) (citing SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE § 484, at 533 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1842)).  
213 (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1094 (K.B.); 2 Camp. 99. 
214 Id. at 1095. 
215 Id. (citing Rex v. Mothersall, (1718) 93 Eng. Rep. (K.B.) 405, 405; 1 Strange 93, 93; 
Thetford’s Case, (1719) 93 Eng. Rep. (K.B.) 405, 405; 1 Strange 93, 93).  Michael Polelle 
identifies three treatise writers who noted the existence of a business records exception for 
hearsay at common law.  Polelle, supra note 123, at 292 & n.35; see also VAUGHN C. BALL 
ET AL., MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 305, at 717-19 (2d ed. 1972) 
(discussing evolution of common law business records exception in the years preceding the 
Framing); BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at 368 (describing an analogue to the modern 
business records exception, that allowed an entry in a shopbook or book of account to be 
admitted if the “servant (who was accustomed to make those entries) be dead” as this is “the 
best evidence that can then be produced”).  Disagreeing with Justice Scalia, and an amicus 
brief, Davies argues that “there was no broad framing-era hearsay exception for ‘business 
records,’” but only a narrow exception for the admission of the “‘shop-book’ of a merchant . 
. . as evidence to prove delivery of goods in civil lawsuits.”  Davies, supra note 15, at 362 
n.33, 366 n.43 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at 368-69).  Davies discusses this issue 
in two footnotes and does not address the cases discussed above.  See id.  In any event, even 
Davies’ arguments may allow for isolated examples of the admission of business records in 
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Paralleling Crawford’s sui generis exception for dying declarations, the 
common law authority discussed above supports a historical exception to the 
confrontation right for business records and analogous hearsay – something 
that, even if not fully developed at the time of the Framing, few commentators 
or judges will likely resist.216  Admission of routine business and public 
records without confrontation is generally uncontroversial, and rarely 
implicates the textual, historical, or policy concerns of the confrontation right.  
The precise nature of the business and public records exception for modern 
times would need to be developed through the caselaw, and may turn out to be 
narrower than prosecutors might like.217  Nevertheless, as with dying 
declarations, some form of the public or business records exception to hearsay 
doctrine existed at the time of the Framing.  Absent evidence that the Sixth 
Amendment’s drafters sought its extermination, this same exception could be 
relied upon to admit business and public records (regardless of declarant 
availability) over Confrontation Clause objection in the modern era. 
 
criminal cases – which is probably the most that can be expected of a time when, given the 
nature of criminal law enforcement, few prosecutions would be expected to rely on business 
records.  Cf. Langbein, supra note 136, at 1178 (stating that at the time of the Framing, 
“written evidence was always relatively unimportant in criminal prosecutions for felony”). 
216 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (stating that the Confrontation 
Clause “is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, 
admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding”).  Oregon requires 
available hearsay declarants to testify if their hearsay (nontestimonial or otherwise) is to be 
admitted.  See supra note 187.  Applying an analysis similar to that suggested here, the 
Oregon courts make an exception to this seemingly blanket requirement for public and 
business records, explaining that “the unavailability requirement that otherwise may apply . 
. . does not apply in this case, because the framers of the Oregon Constitution would have 
understood public and official records to have constituted an exception to the confrontation 
rights guarantee.”  State v. William, 110 P.3d 1114, 1116-17 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); see also 
State v. Partee, 573 P.2d 751, 753-54 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting state and federal 
Confrontation Clause challenges to admission of business records even though the 
“defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the person who originally 
prepared the records”).   
217 See FED. R. EVID. 803(5) advisory committee’s note (evidencing a desire to broaden 
the common law notion of “business records” admissible over a hearsay objection); see also 
Salte v. Thomas, (1802) 127 Eng. Rep. 104 (H.L.) 105; 3 Bos. & Pul. 188, 190 
(distinguishing Aickles because “there was no document of the fact which was proved [in 
that case] but the book itself, and no other evidence could have been resorted to except the 
parole testimony of the turnkey who might happen to be in the prison at the time of the 
prisoner’s discharge”).  Records prepared “for use in litigation” would be inadmissible.  
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321 n.7 (2009); see also Palmer v. 
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943); Aickles, 168 Eng. Rep. at 298 (emphasizing that 
“Newman has no private interest whatsoever in this book, to induce him to make factitious 
entries in it”); cf. Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 369 n.12 (highlighting types of business 
records that, contrary to the conclusory assertion of the Crawford majority, seem to require 
Confrontation Clause scrutiny). 
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AN UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT 
Supplementing existing Confrontation Clause jurisprudence with an 
unavailability requirement erects real obstacles to prosecutors’ use of 
nontestimonial hearsay to prove defendants’ guilt.218  Numerous hearsay 
exceptions currently allow prosecutors to introduce out-of-court statements 
regardless of the declarant’s availability.  For example, the twenty-three 
hearsay exceptions in Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permit the 
introduction of hearsay “regardless of whether the declarant is available as a 
witness.”219  State hearsay rules generally follow suit.220  If prosecutors are 
required, as a constitutional matter, to demonstrate unavailability prior to 
invoking these exceptions, their ability to introduce hearsay will be 
significantly curtailed.221  In cases where prosecutors could previously fill 
evidentiary voids with nontestimonial hearsay, the prosecution would either 
have to introduce the declarant’s live testimony or demonstrate unavailability. 
The effects of the proposed unavailability requirement on prosecutors (and 
witnesses) raise important policy concerns.  Commentators already criticize 
Crawford for exacerbating the difficulties of prosecuting domestic violence 
and child abuse offenses where victims are unable or unwilling to cooperate 
with prosecutors.222  The government’s merits brief in Inadi similarly criticized 
 
218 Kirkpatrick, supra note 155, at 667 (stating that an unavailability requirement “would 
severely restrict the use by prosecutors of numerous hearsay exceptions that have 
traditionally been available”). 
219
 FED. R. EVID. 803.  Rule 803 includes exceptions for excited utterances, present sense 
impressions, and statements for purposes of medical treatment.  Id.  Statements of a 
coconspirator, agent, or employee can also be admitted without a showing of unavailability.  
See FED. R. EVID. 801. 
220 See, e.g., HAW. R. EVID. 803; MICH. R. EVID. 803; N.J. R. EVID. 803; N.C. R. EVID. 
803; OHIO R. EVID. 803; PA. R. EVID. 803; TEX. R. EVID. 803; W. VA. R. EVID. 803; cf. Glen 
Weissenberger, Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1525, 1533 
(1996) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence have served as a model for many state evidence 
codes . . . .”). 
221 Many states also provide specific hearsay exceptions designed to admit out-of-court 
statements by child victims, but these provisions, like the proposal in this Article, usually 
require either the child to testify or a finding of “unavailability.”  See Commonwealth v. 
Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 163-64 (Pa. 2011) (describing the Pennsylvania statute); 
Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 372, 378 n.55.  Some states extend “unavailability” in this 
context to circumstances where the child, while technically available, would likely be 
emotionally traumatized in the process.  See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation 
Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691-92, 700 & n.32; cf. Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (ruling that “unavailability” for Confrontation Clause purposes included 
circumstances where an “attempt to extract evidence from [the victim] in a courtroom 
setting was likely to be not only futile but also psychologically harmful to her”). 
222 See Donald A. Dripps, Controlling the Damage Done by Crawford v. Washington: 
Three Constructive Proposals, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 535 (2010) (arguing that, in light 
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Roberts for articulating an unavailability requirement that would unnecessarily 
hamstring complex conspiracy prosecutions; the Court in Inadi adopted these 
concerns wholesale.223  The proposal articulated here may be opposed on 
similar grounds.  As this Part explains, however, the implications of an 
unavailability prerequisite to the admission of nontestimonial hearsay are not 
as stark as might first be suspected and, in any event, do not form a compelling 
basis for rejecting the proposed expansion of the modern confrontation right. 
It is worth noting at the outset that not all observers will view the proposed 
unavailability requirement negatively.  From a defense perspective, the 
development is clearly beneficial.224  Viewed in the best light, this is because 
there are cases where innocent (or partially innocent)225 defendants’ inability to 
cross-examine their accusers deprives the jury of information that would lead 
to an acquittal (or less severe sentence).  Even in the domestic violence context 
where fear of, or affinity for, a cohabitant is a common reason for victim 
noncooperation, one cannot entirely discount the possibility that the initial out-
of-court reports of abuse contain flaws and omissions.  Such reports 
(particularly as recounted by others) may be overstated or omit details that 
could exculpate the defendant or diminish the defendant’s culpability.  Outside 
of the domestic violence context, this possibility informs the argument, 
generally accepted in the United States, that live testimony is a crucial 
component of the search for truth and procedural fairness.226  The possibility 
cannot be completely discounted in domestic violence, child abuse, or complex 
conspiracy prosecutions. 
 
of obstacles raised, particularly in prosecution of domestic violence cases, “Crawford has 
set back the quest for rational adjudication”); Lininger, supra note 3, at 768; Orenstein, 
supra note 47, at 145.  Some of the fears of a drastic effect on domestic violence 
prosecutions that emerged have been tempered by the Court’s narrowing view of which 
statements are testimonial and its expansive view of forfeiture by wrongdoing.  See 
Lininger, supra note 3, at 818-19 (writing prior to Davis that one way “to salvage domestic 
violence prosecutions after Crawford” is “to engage in the intellectually dishonest exercise 
of labeling most statements by victims to police as ‘nontestimonial,’” but arguing that 
“[s]uch an approach might seem expedient, but it would not be true to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause”). 
223 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1986); see also White v. Illinois, 502 
U.S. 346, 354-55 (1992); Brief for the United States at 37, Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (No. 84-
1580) (critiquing the “practical wisdom” of an unavailability rule, particularly in “large-
scale drug conspiracy or organized crime cases”). 
224 Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 376 (“[A] general consensus exists that it is important 
to have the child [victim in a sexual abuse case] testify when possible, given the nature of 
the crime and the severity of the penalties.”). 
225 A “partially” innocent defendant is guilty of some but not all of the offenses charged, 
or is guilty of a lesser offense than the charged offense.  
226 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (“The perception that confrontation is 
essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it.”); 
Lininger, supra note 3, at 772. 
  
1912 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1865 
 
Many observers will, understandably, adopt a different perspective and view 
the addition of an unavailability prerequisite to the admission of 
nontestimonial hearsay as a practical disaster.  To these observers, the 
requirement will exacerbate the under-prosecution of domestic violence and 
child abuse cases, needlessly burden prosecutions in other contexts, and, 
perhaps worst of all, increase the incentive for defendants to cause victims to 
fail to appear at trial.227  While these concerns are important, they can be 
overstated.  There will be few instances where the prosecution must abandon a 
case due to an unavailability requirement.  When the victim or witness is truly 
unavailable (for example, a fearful witness flees the jurisdiction, refuses to 
comply with subpoenas, or cannot be located),228 nothing changes: the 
prosecution, after making a showing of unavailability, can present any out-of-
court statements that would be admissible under current doctrine.  In addition, 
since a witness’s refusal or inability to testify will constitute unavailability, the 
proposed reform entails no change in existing incentives for witness 
intimidation.229 
For the diligent prosecutor, obstacles to admission of hearsay statements 
only arise under this proposal when the witness is available.  In this scenario, 
the prosecutor can overcome the obstacles by securing the witness’s attendance 
at trial.  If the prosecution produces the witness, the witness’s out-of-court 
statements (and in-court testimony) become unobjectionable under the 
Confrontation Clause because the defendant can confront the witness.230 
Nevertheless, an unavailability requirement will undoubtedly lead to fewer 
prosecutions for a number of reasons.  Most directly, there may be cases where 
the prosecution declines to go forward to relieve an otherwise available victim 
or witness of the burden of testifying.231  If the prosecutor could have obtained 
a conviction with nontestimonial hearsay, dismissal will be the fault of the new 
unavailability requirement.  Relatedly, there will be cases where victims and 
witnesses will suffer harm and inconvenience from the “ordeal of cross-
 
227 Lininger, supra note 3, at 771. 
228 See Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 494 (2011) (reviewing a case in which state 
courts deemed the victim of a sexual assault “unavailable” after she fled the jurisdiction to 
avoid testifying and could not be located, and upholding the state court ruling as reasonable 
interpretation of constitutional law). 
229 See United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
witness’s refusal to testify against his father constituted “unavailability” for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause); Jennings v. Maynard, 946 F.2d 1502, 1505 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that the witness’s refusal to testify out of fear, after receiving threats, constituted 
“unavailability” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause). 
230 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004) (“[W]hen the declarant appears 
for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the 
use of his prior testimonial statements.”). 
231 Trial testimony is only one aspect of this burden.  Even if a victim avoids testifying at 
trial, the victim may still be required to testify in a pretrial examination, to a grand jury, or 
in semi-formal conferences with police and prosecutors.   
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examination” if they must testify when previously the prosecution could rely 
on nontestimonial hearsay alone.232  If an out-of-court statement is critical to a 
case, a prosecutor may go so far as to obtain a material witness warrant to 
detain the witness until trial – something that already occurs when an 
important case depends on an uncooperative victim’s testimony or testimonial 
hearsay, but could occur more frequently with the proposed unavailability 
requirement.233 
Critics of this proposal will correctly note as well that, as with any 
additional doctrinal hurdle, an unavailability requirement will result in a 
greater number of prosecutions falling through the cracks.  Due to the 
unprecedented scope of modern law enforcement, many prosecutors juggle 
hundreds of cases at a time.234  A prosecutor may forget to subpoena a witness, 
fail to realize the obligation to do so, or simply overlook certain pretrial tasks 
due to caseload pressures.  This is most likely to occur in misdemeanor cases, 
which make up a large portion of domestic violence prosecutions.235  In such 
circumstances, a case that could have gone forward based on nontestimonial 
hearsay may be dismissed due to the prosecutor’s failure to demonstrate the 
declarant’s unavailability.  Still, dismissal is neither certain nor dispositive.  
The prosecutor could avoid dismissal by seeking a continuance to remedy an 
inadvertent failure to subpoena a witness or, if unsuccessful, reinitiate the 
prosecution assuming that a dismissal is “without prejudice” (a safe 
assumption if the prosecutor’s failure resulted from negligence as opposed to 
bad faith).236  If prosecutors refrain from taking these steps due to caseload 
pressure or indifference, it is again tempting to blame the unavailability 
requirement.  In this context, however, the blame is not well placed.  The 
government must choose how to spend its resources.  If the choice is to bring 
so many prosecutions (including many prosecutions for non-violent, victimless 
crimes)237 that even serious, violent offenders go unpunished due to negligence 
 
232 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). 
233 See Lininger, supra note 3, at 787; Orenstein, supra note 47, at 146; Raeder, supra 
note 113, at 328.  The calculus of whether to prosecute a case against the wishes of a 
reluctant victim is complex.  See Lininger, supra note 3, at 782; Orenstein supra note 47, at 
145, 147 (describing literature suggesting that “Crawford empowers battered women” but 
disagreeing because “the so-called ‘autonomy’ of the accuser is illusory in many domestic 
violence cases”). 
234 See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How 
Excessive Prosecutor Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 270 
(2011). 
235 Lininger, supra note 3, at 822 (chronicling survey responses of state prosecutors in 
which eighty-two percent reported that a majority of domestic violence cases in their 
jurisdictions were misdemeanors). 
236 See United States v. Stoker, 522 F.2d 576, 580 (10th Cir. 1975) (“A dismissal resting 
on a non-constitutional ground such as ‘want of prosecution’ or ‘calendar control’ is 
normally without prejudice to a subsequent prosecution.”). 
237 See Luna, supra note 53, at 777 (chronicling “the overwhelming volume of narcotics 
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and lack of diligence, the fault lies most squarely with the allocation of 
resources, and not with doctrinal rules such as an unavailability requirement 
(or, for that matter, the right to a jury trial or the presumption of innocence).238 
In addition, the number of cases where prosecutions stall due to the 
proposed unavailability requirement can be minimized through judicially or 
statutorily authorized pretrial procedures.239  In many domestic violence cases, 
for example, it will be clear to the defense that the victim’s presence at trial 
will hurt, not help their cause.  In such circumstances, the defense may be 
willing to waive any availability-based objection to the admission of a victim’s 
hearsay statements to decrease the chances that the prosecution will call the 
victim to testify.240  The pretrial procedure for obtaining the requisite waiver 
could be modeled on the “notice and demand” statutes approved in dicta in 
Melendez-Diaz.241  If jurisdictions can create notice-and-demand systems to 
relieve government chemists of the burden of testifying when neither party 
desires their presence at trial, they can (and should) implement analogous 
procedures for civilian witnesses, such as child abuse victims and victims of 
domestic violence.242 
The real-world implications of Confrontation Clause doctrine are important 
to consider.  As White’s curtailment of the brief post-Roberts experiment with 
a broad unavailability requirement suggests, the chief arguments against the 
proposal outlined here may, in fact, be policy based.243  At the same time, a 
 
cases in the legal system”). 
238 Cf. Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads, a Response to Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 106 NW. U. 
L. REV. 143, 155 (2011) (arguing that when prosecutorial resources are overtaxed, 
prosecuting agencies can charge fewer cases, focusing existing resources on “the cases that 
matter . . . most”).  The government may also direct its resources toward identifying and 
prosecuting the perpetrators of domestic violence incidents who are most likely to escalate 
their violent behavior, and assisting the victims of those perpetrators to safely exit 
dangerous situations.  A typical misdemeanor prosecution does little to accomplish either of 
these goals. 
239 Lininger, supra note 3, at 753 (proposing “legislative reforms” to ease domestic 
violence prosecutions after Crawford). 
240 Remorseful defendants may waive the requirement that a victim testify to minimize 
further harm to the victim and, perhaps, curry favor with the judge. 
241 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 327 (2009) (stating that “[t]here is no 
conceivable reason why” the defendant “cannot . . . be compelled to exercise his 
Confrontation Clause rights before trial”); see, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 
(West 2003) (requiring the prosecutor to provide notice of desire to introduce chemist 
affidavit, and then requiring the defendant to demand live testimony at least ten days before 
trial); cf. Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedure for Resolving Hearsay Issues, 13 
CARDOZO L. REV. 883, 892-904 (1991). 
242 Unlike a government chemist, however, a crime victim may want to testify in court to 
ensure that his or her voice is heard. 
243 See supra Part III.A. 
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debate on policy grounds is likely impossible to resolve to the satisfaction of 
either side.244  To a significant extent, this is the same centuries-old debate that 
preceded the adoption of the Sixth Amendment.  Raleigh’s judges, like modern 
critics, warned of the dire consequences for the King’s justice if Raleigh’s 
requested confrontation right were recognized: common criminals would go 
free due to practical impediments to prosecution,245 and serious offenses would 
“flourish.”246  His judges also questioned the practical utility of confrontation 
where, as with Cobham’s self-inculpating confession (according to Chief 
Justice Popham, the “strongest” of “all other proofs”), hearsay was self-
evidently reliable.247  Reflecting a modern argument in the domestic violence 
context, the judges discounted the significance of any change of heart Cobham 
might voice in live testimony; after all, any deviation from Cobham’s pretrial 
confession would only confirm that Raleigh improperly influenced Cobham 
(who, according to the prosecution, “was afraid of Raleigh”) prior to trial.248 
Raleigh’s British judges were villains no doubt, but their arguments were 
not frivolous.  As in Raleigh’s time, reasonable people can disagree about the 
tradeoffs required by a robust right to confrontation.  The key point, however, 
is that the Framers sided with Raleigh.  Recognizing the obstacles it might 
create for the administration of justice, they granted the accused the right to 
“be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  The fact that the dangers 
foreseen by Raleigh’s judges – the losing party in this debate – now resonate in 
 
244 Cf. Orenstein, supra note 202, at 1455 & n.280; Raeder, supra note 113, at 313-14 
(recognizing the difficulty of “ensur[ing] that the voices of women and children are heard, 
without eviscerating the ability of the defendant to confront live complainants, and not just 
second hand witnesses”). 
245 COBBETT’S, supra note 169, at 18 (Justice Wharburton: “[S]o many horse-stealers 
may escape, if they may not be condemned without Witnesses.”).  Interestingly, Justice 
Wharburton’s concern came to fruition in an early American case.  See State v. Webb, 2 
N.C. (Mart.) 103, 103 (1794) (rejecting effort to introduce deposition of purchaser of stolen 
horse in trial of Pleasant Webb “for horse-stealing”). 
246 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (stating that “the prosecution 
responded” to Raleigh’s requests “with many of the arguments a court applying Roberts 
might invoke today”); COBBETT’S, supra note 169, at 18 (“This thing cannot be granted for 
then a number of Treasons should flourish . . . .”); JARDINE, supra note 168, at 427 
(recounting that Raleigh’s judges thought confrontation was a means “to cover many with 
treasons”). 
247 JARDINE, supra note 168, at 420. 
248 COBBETT’S, supra note 169, at 19 (“There hath been intelligence between you; and 
what under-hand practices there may be, I know not.”); id. at 22 (“I observe there was 
Intelligence between you and Cobham in the Tower . . . .”); id. at 10 (relaying that Cobham 
“was afraid of Raleigh”).  Covering all bases, the judges also speculated that if called to 
testify, Cobham would falsely exonerate Raleigh out of friendship or, more generically, fall 
prey to his rhetorical tricks.  Id. at 24 (“Since he must needs have justice, the acquitting of 
his old friend may move him to speak otherwise than the truth.”); id. at 18 (“[T]o save you, 
his old friend, it may be that he will deny all that which he hath said.”); id. at 18 (“[T]he 
Accuser may be drawn by practice.”). 
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our own administration of justice suggests not that Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence is off track, but that it is finally finding its proper role. 
CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice John Marshall thought that the inadmissibility of informal, out-
of-court statements offered in the 1807 prosecution of Aaron Burr was a fairly 
easy call.  The Chief Justice wondered why “a man should have a 
constitutional claim to be confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere 
verbal declarations, made in his absence, may be evidence against him.”249  
Two centuries later, the Davis Court also viewed the constitutional treatment 
of mere verbal declarations (i.e., “nontestimonial” statements) as fairly 
obvious.250  But the Court came to the opposite conclusion.  Someone is wrong 
here and, given Chief Justice Marshall’s proximity to the Framing era, it is 
hard to side against him.  The proximity intuition is not all we have, however.  
As this Article details, there is abundant evidence to conclude that the Davis 
Court, not Chief Justice Marshall, misread the authority on this critical point.  
The Court’s error can be shown as a matter of textual and historical analysis.  
In addition, when applied to real-world fact patterns, as in Davis and Bryant, 
the Court’s conclusion that the out-of-court speakers of “nontestimonial” 
statements are not “witnesses against” the defendant vanishes in a puff of 
common sense. 
The Court’s error in placing nontestimonial hearsay outside the bounds of 
the Confrontation Clause, while serious, does not damn the entire 
jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court is right to finally focus its Confrontation 
Clause analysis on core, “testimonial” hearsay.  Framing-era authorities 
recoiled at the prospect of the admission of such evidence, and for good 
reason.  The Court must preserve this intuition while revisiting its conclusion 
that hearsay falling outside this core class of statements triggers no 
Confrontation Clause protections whatsoever. 
 
 
249 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694). 
250 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 (2006). 
